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authorAndrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com>2017-10-03 17:38:53 +0200
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2017-11-05 13:44:54 +0000
commitb1c25a68bfcf8309557867eb533b50ce489bc06e (patch)
treed2d582a7f4466a17130bf756ff64e515a195d418 /meta/recipes-core/busybox
parent55740077a1f3bed5956fe02ef17ba1d99176ea24 (diff)
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busybox: Fix CVE-2011-5325
Signed-off-by: Radovan Scasny <radovan.scasny@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-core/busybox')
-rwxr-xr-xmeta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2011-5325.patch481
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.27.2.bb1
2 files changed, 482 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2011-5325.patch b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2011-5325.patch
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000..0926107bea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2011-5325.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,481 @@
+busybox-1.27.2: Fix CVE-2011-5325
+
+[No upstream tracking] -- https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=8411
+
+libarchive: do not extract unsafe symlinks
+
+Prevent unsafe links extracting unless env variable $EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS=1
+is not set. Untarring file with -C DESTDIR parameter could be extracted with
+unwanted symlinks. This doesn't feel right, and IIRC GNU tar doesn't do that.
+Include necessary changes from previous commits.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=bc9bbeb2b81001e8731cd2ae501c8fccc8d87cc7]
+CVE: CVE-2011-5325
+bug: 8411
+Signed-off-by: Radovan Scasny <radovan.scasny@siemens.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com>
+
+diff --git a/archival/libarchive/Kbuild.src b/archival/libarchive/Kbuild.src
+index 942e755..e1a8a75 100644
+--- a/archival/libarchive/Kbuild.src
++++ b/archival/libarchive/Kbuild.src
+@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ COMMON_FILES:= \
+ data_extract_all.o \
+ data_extract_to_stdout.o \
+ \
++ unsafe_symlink_target.o \
++\
+ filter_accept_all.o \
+ filter_accept_list.o \
+ filter_accept_reject_list.o \
+diff --git a/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c b/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c
+index 1830ffb..b828b65 100644
+--- a/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c
++++ b/archival/libarchive/data_extract_all.c
+@@ -128,10 +128,9 @@ void FAST_FUNC data_extract_all(archive_handle_t *archive_handle)
+ res = link(hard_link, dst_name);
+ if (res != 0 && !(archive_handle->ah_flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_QUIET)) {
+ /* shared message */
+- bb_perror_msg("can't create %slink "
+- "%s to %s", "hard",
+- dst_name,
+- hard_link);
++ bb_perror_msg("can't create %slink '%s' to '%s'",
++ "hard", dst_name, hard_link
++ );
+ }
+ /* Hardlinks have no separate mode/ownership, skip chown/chmod */
+ goto ret;
+@@ -178,15 +177,17 @@ void FAST_FUNC data_extract_all(archive_handle_t *archive_handle)
+ case S_IFLNK:
+ /* Symlink */
+ //TODO: what if file_header->link_target == NULL (say, corrupted tarball?)
+- res = symlink(file_header->link_target, dst_name);
+- if (res != 0
+- && !(archive_handle->ah_flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_QUIET)
+- ) {
+- /* shared message */
+- bb_perror_msg("can't create %slink "
+- "%s to %s", "sym",
+- dst_name,
+- file_header->link_target);
++ if (!unsafe_symlink_target(file_header->link_target)) {
++ res = symlink(file_header->link_target, dst_name);
++ if (res != 0
++ && !(archive_handle->ah_flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_QUIET)
++ ) {
++ /* shared message */
++ bb_perror_msg("can't create %slink '%s' to '%s'",
++ "sym",
++ dst_name, file_header->link_target
++ );
++ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case S_IFSOCK:
+diff --git a/archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c b/archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ee46e28
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/archival/libarchive/unsafe_symlink_target.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
++/* vi: set sw=4 ts=4: */
++/*
++ * Licensed under GPLv2 or later, see file LICENSE in this source tree.
++ */
++#include "libbb.h"
++#include "bb_archive.h"
++
++int FAST_FUNC unsafe_symlink_target(const char *target)
++{
++ const char *dot;
++
++ if (target[0] == '/') {
++ const char *var;
++unsafe:
++ var = getenv("EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS");
++ if (var) {
++ if (LONE_CHAR(var, '1'))
++ return 0; /* pretend it's safe */
++ return 1; /* "UNSAFE!" */
++ }
++ bb_error_msg("skipping unsafe symlink to '%s' in archive,"
++ " set %s=1 to extract",
++ target,
++ "EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS"
++ );
++ /* Prevent further messages */
++ setenv("EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS", "0", 0);
++ return 1; /* "UNSAFE!" */
++ }
++
++ dot = target;
++ for (;;) {
++ dot = strchr(dot, '.');
++ if (!dot)
++ return 0; /* safe target */
++
++ /* Is it a path component starting with ".."? */
++ if ((dot[1] == '.')
++ && (dot == target || dot[-1] == '/')
++ /* Is it exactly ".."? */
++ && (dot[2] == '/' || dot[2] == '\0')
++ ) {
++ goto unsafe;
++ }
++ /* NB: it can even be trailing ".", should only add 1 */
++ dot += 1;
++ }
++}
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/archival/unzip.c b/archival/unzip.c
+index 9037262..270e261 100644
+--- a/archival/unzip.c
++++ b/archival/unzip.c
+@@ -335,6 +335,44 @@ static void unzip_create_leading_dirs(const char *fn)
+ free(name);
+ }
+
++static void unzip_extract_symlink(zip_header_t *zip, const char *dst_fn)
++{
++ char *target;
++
++ if (zip->fmt.ucmpsize > 0xfff) /* no funny business please */
++ bb_error_msg_and_die("bad archive");
++
++ if (zip->fmt.method == 0) {
++ /* Method 0 - stored (not compressed) */
++ target = xzalloc(zip->fmt.ucmpsize + 1);
++ xread(zip_fd, target, zip->fmt.ucmpsize);
++ } else {
++#if 1
++ bb_error_msg_and_die("compressed symlink is not supported");
++#else
++ transformer_state_t xstate;
++ init_transformer_state(&xstate);
++ xstate.mem_output_size_max = zip->fmt.ucmpsize;
++ /* ...unpack... */
++ if (!xstate.mem_output_buf)
++ WTF();
++ target = xstate.mem_output_buf;
++ target = xrealloc(target, xstate.mem_output_size + 1);
++ target[xstate.mem_output_size] = '\0';
++#endif
++ }
++ if (!unsafe_symlink_target(target)) {
++//TODO: libbb candidate
++ if (symlink(target, dst_fn)) {
++ /* shared message */
++ bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't create %slink '%s' to '%s'",
++ "sym", dst_fn, target
++ );
++ }
++ }
++ free(target);
++}
++
+ static void unzip_extract(zip_header_t *zip, int dst_fd)
+ {
+ transformer_state_t xstate;
+@@ -813,7 +851,7 @@ int unzip_main(int argc, char **argv)
+ }
+ check_file:
+ /* Extract file */
+- if (stat(dst_fn, &stat_buf) == -1) {
++ if (lstat(dst_fn, &stat_buf) == -1) {
+ /* File does not exist */
+ if (errno != ENOENT) {
+ bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't stat '%s'", dst_fn);
+@@ -834,6 +872,7 @@ int unzip_main(int argc, char **argv)
+ goto do_open_and_extract;
+ printf("replace %s? [y]es, [n]o, [A]ll, [N]one, [r]ename: ", dst_fn);
+ my_fgets80(key_buf);
++//TODO: redo lstat + ISREG check! user input could have taken a long time!
+
+ switch (key_buf[0]) {
+ case 'A':
+@@ -842,7 +881,8 @@ int unzip_main(int argc, char **argv)
+ do_open_and_extract:
+ unzip_create_leading_dirs(dst_fn);
+ #if ENABLE_FEATURE_UNZIP_CDF
+- dst_fd = xopen3(dst_fn, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, file_mode);
++ if (!S_ISLNK(file_mode))
++ dst_fd = xopen3(dst_fn, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, file_mode);
+ #else
+ dst_fd = xopen(dst_fn, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC);
+ #endif
+@@ -852,10 +892,18 @@ int unzip_main(int argc, char **argv)
+ ? " extracting: %s\n"
+ : */ " inflating: %s\n", dst_fn);
+ }
+- unzip_extract(&zip, dst_fd);
+- if (dst_fd != STDOUT_FILENO) {
+- /* closing STDOUT is potentially bad for future business */
+- close(dst_fd);
++#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UNZIP_CDF
++ if (S_ISLNK(file_mode)) {
++ if (dst_fd != STDOUT_FILENO) /* no -p */
++ unzip_extract_symlink(&zip, dst_fn);
++ } else
++#endif
++ {
++ unzip_extract(&zip, dst_fd);
++ if (dst_fd != STDOUT_FILENO) {
++ /* closing STDOUT is potentially bad for future business */
++ close(dst_fd);
++ };
+ }
+ break;
+
+diff --git a/coreutils/link.c b/coreutils/link.c
+index ac3ef85..aab249d 100644
+--- a/coreutils/link.c
++++ b/coreutils/link.c
+@@ -32,9 +32,8 @@ int link_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
+ argv += optind;
+ if (link(argv[0], argv[1]) != 0) {
+ /* shared message */
+- bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't create %slink "
+- "%s to %s", "hard",
+- argv[1], argv[0]
++ bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't create %slink '%s' to '%s'",
++ "hard", argv[1], argv[0]
+ );
+ }
+ return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+diff --git a/include/bb_archive.h b/include/bb_archive.h
+index 2b9c5f0..1e4da3c 100644
+--- a/include/bb_archive.h
++++ b/include/bb_archive.h
+@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ void seek_by_jump(int fd, off_t amount) FAST_FUNC;
+ void seek_by_read(int fd, off_t amount) FAST_FUNC;
+
+ const char *strip_unsafe_prefix(const char *str) FAST_FUNC;
++int unsafe_symlink_target(const char *target) FAST_FUNC;
+
+ void data_align(archive_handle_t *archive_handle, unsigned boundary) FAST_FUNC;
+ const llist_t *find_list_entry(const llist_t *list, const char *filename) FAST_FUNC;
+diff --git a/libbb/copy_file.c b/libbb/copy_file.c
+index 23c0f83..be90066 100644
+--- a/libbb/copy_file.c
++++ b/libbb/copy_file.c
+@@ -371,7 +371,10 @@ int FAST_FUNC copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int flags)
+ int r = symlink(lpath, dest);
+ free(lpath);
+ if (r < 0) {
+- bb_perror_msg("can't create symlink '%s'", dest);
++ /* shared message */
++ bb_perror_msg("can't create %slink '%s' to '%s'",
++ "sym", dest, lpath
++ );
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (flags & FILEUTILS_PRESERVE_STATUS)
+diff --git a/testsuite/tar.tests b/testsuite/tar.tests
+index 9f7ce15..b7cd74c 100755
+--- a/testsuite/tar.tests
++++ b/testsuite/tar.tests
+@@ -10,9 +10,6 @@ unset LC_COLLATE
+ unset LC_ALL
+ umask 022
+
+-rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
+-mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
+-
+ # testing "test name" "script" "expected result" "file input" "stdin"
+
+ testing "Empty file is not a tarball" '\
+@@ -53,6 +50,7 @@ dd if=/dev/zero bs=512 count=20 2>/dev/null | tar xvf - 2>&1; echo $?
+ "" ""
+ SKIP=
+
++mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
+ # "tar cf test.tar input input_dir/ input_hard1 input_hard2 input_hard1 input_dir/ input":
+ # GNU tar 1.26 records as hardlinks:
+ # input_hard2 -> input_hard1
+@@ -64,7 +62,6 @@ SKIP=
+ # We also don't use "hrw-r--r--" notation for hardlinks in "tar tv" listing.
+ optional FEATURE_TAR_CREATE FEATURE_LS_SORTFILES
+ testing "tar hardlinks and repeated files" '\
+-rm -rf input_* test.tar 2>/dev/null
+ >input_hard1
+ ln input_hard1 input_hard2
+ mkdir input_dir
+@@ -95,10 +92,11 @@ drwxr-xr-x input_dir
+ " \
+ "" ""
+ SKIP=
++cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
+
++mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
+ optional FEATURE_TAR_CREATE FEATURE_LS_SORTFILES
+ testing "tar hardlinks mode" '\
+-rm -rf input_* test.tar 2>/dev/null
+ >input_hard1
+ chmod 741 input_hard1
+ ln input_hard1 input_hard2
+@@ -128,10 +126,11 @@ Ok: 0
+ " \
+ "" ""
+ SKIP=
++cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
+
++mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
+ optional FEATURE_TAR_CREATE FEATURE_LS_SORTFILES
+ testing "tar symlinks mode" '\
+-rm -rf input_* test.tar 2>/dev/null
+ >input_file
+ chmod 741 input_file
+ ln -s input_file input_soft
+@@ -159,10 +158,11 @@ lrwxrwxrwx input_file
+ " \
+ "" ""
+ SKIP=
++cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
+
++mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
+ optional FEATURE_TAR_CREATE FEATURE_TAR_LONG_OPTIONS
+ testing "tar --overwrite" "\
+-rm -rf input_* test.tar 2>/dev/null
+ ln input input_hard
+ tar cf test.tar input_hard
+ echo WRONG >input
+@@ -174,12 +174,13 @@ Ok
+ " \
+ "Ok\n" ""
+ SKIP=
++cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
+
++mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
+ test x"$SKIP_KNOWN_BUGS" = x"" && {
+ # Needs to be run under non-root for meaningful test
+ optional FEATURE_TAR_CREATE
+ testing "tar writing into read-only dir" '\
+-rm -rf input_* test.tar 2>/dev/null
+ mkdir input_dir
+ >input_dir/input_file
+ chmod 550 input_dir
+@@ -201,7 +202,9 @@ dr-xr-x--- input_dir
+ "" ""
+ SKIP=
+ }
++cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
+
++mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
+ # Had a bug where on extract autodetect first "switched off" -z
+ # and then failed to recognize .tgz extension
+ optional FEATURE_TAR_CREATE FEATURE_SEAMLESS_GZ GUNZIP
+@@ -217,7 +220,9 @@ Ok
+ " \
+ "" ""
+ SKIP=
++cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
+
++mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
+ # Do we detect XZ-compressed data (even w/o .tar.xz or txz extension)?
+ # (the uuencoded hello_world.txz contains one empty file named "hello_world")
+ optional UUDECODE FEATURE_TAR_AUTODETECT FEATURE_SEAMLESS_XZ
+@@ -236,7 +241,9 @@ AAAEWVo=
+ ====
+ "
+ SKIP=
++cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
+
++mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
+ # On extract, everything up to and including last ".." component is stripped
+ optional FEATURE_TAR_CREATE
+ testing "tar strips /../ on extract" "\
+@@ -255,7 +262,9 @@ Ok
+ " \
+ "" ""
+ SKIP=
++cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
+
++mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
+ # attack.tar.bz2 has symlink pointing to a system file
+ # followed by a regular file with the same name
+ # containing "root::0:0::/root:/bin/sh":
+@@ -270,6 +279,7 @@ optional UUDECODE FEATURE_TAR_AUTODETECT FEATURE_SEAMLESS_BZ2
+ testing "tar does not extract into symlinks" "\
+ >>/tmp/passwd && uudecode -o input && tar xf input 2>&1 && rm passwd; cat /tmp/passwd; echo \$?
+ " "\
++tar: skipping unsafe symlink to '/tmp/passwd' in archive, set EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS=1 to extract
+ 0
+ " \
+ "" "\
+@@ -281,12 +291,15 @@ l4/V8LDoe90yiWJhOJvIypgEfxdyRThQkBVn/bI=
+ ====
+ "
+ SKIP=
++cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
++
++mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
+ # And same with -k
+ optional UUDECODE FEATURE_TAR_AUTODETECT FEATURE_SEAMLESS_BZ2
+ testing "tar -k does not extract into symlinks" "\
+ >>/tmp/passwd && uudecode -o input && tar xf input -k 2>&1 && rm passwd; cat /tmp/passwd; echo \$?
+ " "\
+-tar: can't open 'passwd': File exists
++tar: skipping unsafe symlink to '/tmp/passwd' in archive, set EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS=1 to extract
+ 0
+ " \
+ "" "\
+@@ -298,7 +311,9 @@ l4/V8LDoe90yiWJhOJvIypgEfxdyRThQkBVn/bI=
+ ====
+ "
+ SKIP=
++cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
+
++mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
+ optional UNICODE_SUPPORT FEATURE_TAR_GNU_EXTENSIONS FEATURE_SEAMLESS_BZ2 FEATURE_TAR_AUTODETECT
+ testing "Pax-encoded UTF8 names and symlinks" '\
+ tar xvf ../tar.utf8.tar.bz2 2>&1; echo $?
+@@ -309,17 +324,45 @@ rm -rf etc usr
+ ' "\
+ etc/ssl/certs/3b2716e5.0
+ etc/ssl/certs/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.pem
++tar: skipping unsafe symlink to '/usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.crt' in archive, set EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS=1 to extract
+ etc/ssl/certs/f80cc7f6.0
+ usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.crt
+ 0
+ etc/ssl/certs/3b2716e5.0 -> EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.pem
+-etc/ssl/certs/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.pem -> /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.crt
+ etc/ssl/certs/f80cc7f6.0 -> EBG_Elektronik_Sertifika_Hizmet_Sağlayıcısı.pem
+ " \
+ "" ""
+ SKIP=
++cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
+
+-
+-cd .. && rm -rf tar.tempdir || exit 1
++mkdir tar.tempdir && cd tar.tempdir || exit 1
++optional UUDECODE FEATURE_SEAMLESS_BZ2 FEATURE_TAR_AUTODETECT
++testing "Symlink attack: create symlink and then write through it" '\
++exec 2>&1
++uudecode -o input && tar xvf input; echo $?
++ls /tmp/bb_test_evilfile
++ls bb_test_evilfile
++ls symlink/bb_test_evilfile
++' "\
++anything.txt
++symlink
++tar: skipping unsafe symlink to '/tmp' in archive, set EXTRACT_UNSAFE_SYMLINKS=1 to extract
++symlink/bb_test_evilfile
++0
++ls: /tmp/bb_test_evilfile: No such file or directory
++ls: bb_test_evilfile: No such file or directory
++symlink/bb_test_evilfile
++" \
++"" "\
++begin-base64 644 tar_symlink_attack.tar.bz2
++QlpoOTFBWSZTWZgs7bQAALT/hMmQAFBAAf+AEMAGJPPv32AAAIAIMAC5thlR
++omAjAmCMADQT1BqNE0AEwAAjAEwElTKeo9NTR6h6gaeoA0DQNLVdwZZ5iNTk
++AQwCAV6S00QFJYhrlfFkVCEDEGtgNVqYrI0uK3ggnt30gqk4e1TTQm5QIAKa
++SJqzRGSFLMmOloHSAcvLiFxxRiQtQZF+qPxbo173ZDISOAoNoPN4PQPhBhKS
++n8fYaKlioCTzL2oXYczyUUIP4u5IpwoSEwWdtoA=
++====
++"
++SKIP=
++cd .. || exit 1; rm -rf tar.tempdir 2>/dev/null
+
+ exit $FAILCOUNT
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.27.2.bb b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.27.2.bb
index 47b4f48761..575127ec42 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.27.2.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.27.2.bb
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.busybox.net/downloads/busybox-${PV}.tar.bz2;name=tarball \
file://rcK \
file://runlevel \
file://makefile-libbb-race.patch \
+ file://CVE-2011-5325.patch \
"
SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://musl.cfg "