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authorPaul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>2014-12-26 15:05:36 +0000
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2015-01-07 23:33:02 +0000
commit59e0833e24e4945569d36928dc0f231e822670ba (patch)
tree9a2f7b0a967b2cce80835832c045f6f564033034 /meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh
parentbb872893cd5d2bef21b081a424ea6766729fa0dc (diff)
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openssh: upgrade to 6.7p1
* Drop two CVE patches already handled upstream. * Drop nostrip.patch which no longer applies and use the existing --disable-strip configure option instead. * OpenSSH 6.7+ no longer supports tcp wrappers. We could apply the Debian patch to add support back in, but it seems best to follow upstream here unless we have a good reason to do otherwise. Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh')
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/nostrip.patch20
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2011-4327.patch29
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2014-2653.patch114
3 files changed, 0 insertions, 163 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/nostrip.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/nostrip.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 33111f5494..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/nostrip.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-Disable stripping binaries during make install.
-
-Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [configuration]
-
-Build system specific.
-
-Signed-off-by: Scott Garman <scott.a.garman@intel.com>
-
-diff -ur openssh-5.6p1.orig/Makefile.in openssh-5.6p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-5.6p1.orig/Makefile.in 2010-05-11 23:51:39.000000000 -0700
-+++ openssh-5.6p1/Makefile.in 2010-08-30 16:49:54.000000000 -0700
-@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
- RAND_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-rand-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
--STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
-+STRIP_OPT=
-
- PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
- -D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2011-4327.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2011-4327.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 30c11cf432..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2011-4327.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-openssh-CVE-2011-4327
-
-A security flaw was found in the way ssh-keysign,
-a ssh helper program for host based authentication,
-attempted to retrieve enough entropy information on configurations that
-lacked a built-in entropy pool in OpenSSL (a ssh-rand-helper program would
-be executed to retrieve the entropy from the system environment).
-A local attacker could use this flaw to obtain unauthorized access to host keys
-via ptrace(2) process trace attached to the 'ssh-rand-helper' program.
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2011-4327
-http://www.openssh.com/txt/portable-keysign-rand-helper.adv
-
-Upstream-Status: Pending
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Wang <li.wang@windriver.com>
---- a/ssh-keysign.c
-+++ b/ssh-keysign.c
-@@ -170,6 +170,10 @@
- key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
- key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
- key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
-+ if (fcntl(key_fd[0], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0 ||
-+ fcntl(key_fd[1], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0 ||
-+ fcntl(key_fd[2], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0)
-+ fatal("fcntl failed");
-
- original_real_uid = getuid(); /* XXX readconf.c needs this */
- if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL)
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2014-2653.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2014-2653.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 674d186044..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2014-2653.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-This CVE could be removed if openssh is upgrade to 6.6 or higher.
-Below are some details.
-
-Attempt SSHFP lookup even if server presents a certificate
-
-Reference:
-https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=742513
-
-If an ssh server presents a certificate to the client, then the client
-does not check the DNS for SSHFP records. This means that a malicious
-server can essentially disable DNS-host-key-checking, which means the
-client will fall back to asking the user (who will just say "yes" to
-the fingerprint, sadly).
-
-This patch means that the ssh client will, if necessary, extract the
-server key from the proffered certificate, and attempt to verify it
-against the DNS. The patch was written by Mark Wooding
-<mdw@distorted.org.uk>. I modified it to add one debug2 call, reviewed
-it, and tested it.
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
-Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com>
----
---- a/sshconnect.c
-+++ b/sshconnect.c
-@@ -1210,36 +1210,63 @@ fail:
- return -1;
- }
-
-+static int
-+check_host_key_sshfp(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
-+{
-+ int rc = -1;
-+ int flags = 0;
-+ Key *raw_key = NULL;
-+
-+ if (!options.verify_host_key_dns)
-+ goto done;
-+
-+ /* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS; try looking the raw key
-+ * up in the DNS anyway.
-+ */
-+ if (key_is_cert(host_key)) {
-+ debug2("Extracting key from cert for SSHFP lookup");
-+ raw_key = key_from_private(host_key);
-+ if (key_drop_cert(raw_key))
-+ fatal("Couldn't drop certificate");
-+ host_key = raw_key;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags))
-+ goto done;
-+
-+ if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
-+
-+ if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 &&
-+ flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH &&
-+ flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) {
-+ rc = 0;
-+ } else if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) {
-+ matching_host_key_dns = 1;
-+ } else {
-+ warn_changed_key(host_key);
-+ error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS with the new "
-+ "host key to get rid of this message.");
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+done:
-+ if (raw_key)
-+ key_free(raw_key);
-+ return rc;
-+}
-+
- /* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */
- int
- verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
- {
-- int flags = 0;
- char *fp;
-
- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp);
- free(fp);
-
-- /* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */
-- if (!key_is_cert(host_key) && options.verify_host_key_dns &&
-- verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags) == 0) {
-- if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
--
-- if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 &&
-- flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH &&
-- flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE)
-- return 0;
--
-- if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) {
-- matching_host_key_dns = 1;
-- } else {
-- warn_changed_key(host_key);
-- error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS with the new "
-- "host key to get rid of this message.");
-- }
-- }
-- }
-+ if (check_host_key_sshfp(host, hostaddr, host_key) == 0)
-+ return 0;
-
- return check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW,
- options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles,
---
-1.7.9.5
-