bluez5: Upgrade 5.46 -> 5.47

This release includes:

- SDP fix for CVE-2017-1000250.
- New bluetooth mesh profile.
- Various fixes to GATT, A2DP and BR/EDR vs LE bearer handling.

This commit also drops the following two patches which are included in
5.47:

- 0001-hciattach-bcm43xx-fix-the-delay-timer-for-firmware-d.patch
- cve-2017-1000250.patch

Signed-off-by: Marc Ferland <ferlandm@amotus.ca>
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>

2 files changed, 0 insertions, 70 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/0001-hciattach-bcm43xx-fix-the-delay-timer-for-firmware-d.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/0001-hciattach-bcm43xx-fix-the-delay-timer-for-firmware-d.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 46794381f7..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/0001-hciattach-bcm43xx-fix-the-delay-timer-for-firmware-d.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-From 3b341fb421ef61db7782bf1314ec693828467de9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andy Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com>
-Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 17:12:12 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] hciattach: bcm43xx: fix the delay timer for firmware download
-
-From the log in .bcm43xx_load_firmware():
-        /* Wait 50ms to let the firmware placed in download mode */
-        nanosleep(&tm_mode, NULL);
-
-But timespec tm_mode is real is 50us. Correct the delayed timer count.
-
-Upstream-Status: Accepted [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/bluetooth/bluez.git/commit/?id=76255f732d68aef2b90d36d9c7be51a9e1739ce7]
-
-Signed-off-by: Fugang Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com>
----
- tools/hciattach_bcm43xx.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/hciattach_bcm43xx.c b/tools/hciattach_bcm43xx.c
-index 81f38cb..ac1b3c1 100644
---- a/tools/hciattach_bcm43xx.c
-+++ b/tools/hciattach_bcm43xx.c
-@@ -228,8 +228,8 @@ static int bcm43xx_set_speed(int fd, struct termios *ti, uint32_t speed)
- static int bcm43xx_load_firmware(int fd, const char *fw)
- {
- 	unsigned char cmd[] = { HCI_COMMAND_PKT, 0x2e, 0xfc, 0x00 };
--	struct timespec tm_mode = { 0, 50000 };
--	struct timespec tm_ready = { 0, 2000000 };
-+	struct timespec tm_mode = { 0, 50000000 };
-+	struct timespec tm_ready = { 0, 200000000 };
- 	unsigned char resp[CC_MIN_SIZE];
- 	unsigned char tx_buf[1024];
- 	int len, fd_fw, n;
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9fac961bcf..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-All versions of the SDP server in BlueZ 5.46 and earlier are vulnerable to an
-information disclosure vulnerability which allows remote attackers to obtain
-sensitive information from the bluetoothd process memory. This vulnerability
-lies in the processing of SDP search attribute requests.
-
-CVE: CVE-2017-1000250
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
-
-From 9e009647b14e810e06626dde7f1bb9ea3c375d09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
-Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2017 10:01:40 +0300
-Subject: sdp: Fix Out-of-bounds heap read in service_search_attr_req function
-
-Check if there is enough data to continue otherwise return an error.
----
- src/sdpd-request.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/sdpd-request.c b/src/sdpd-request.c
-index 1eefdce..318d044 100644
---- a/src/sdpd-request.c
-+++ b/src/sdpd-request.c
-@@ -917,7 +917,7 @@ static int service_search_attr_req(sdp_req_t *req, sdp_buf_t *buf)
- 	} else {
- 		/* continuation State exists -> get from cache */
- 		sdp_buf_t *pCache = sdp_get_cached_rsp(cstate);
--		if (pCache) {
-+		if (pCache && cstate->cStateValue.maxBytesSent < pCache->data_size) {
- 			uint16_t sent = MIN(max, pCache->data_size - cstate->cStateValue.maxBytesSent);
- 			pResponse = pCache->data;
- 			memcpy(buf->data, pResponse + cstate->cStateValue.maxBytesSent, sent);
--- 
-cgit v1.1