diff options
author | Bhabu Bindu <bindudaniel1996@gmail.com> | 2023-01-09 15:05:18 +0530 |
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committer | Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> | 2023-01-16 04:41:29 -1000 |
commit | 4cb3874abf4fdeb04337a48a14c765ba9b2269d4 (patch) | |
tree | 473da0a55a111a777caa28bd790985a1917d1b1e | |
parent | 6060dec1fc9d215f6b2ff9d6571bac802ac6a09b (diff) | |
download | openembedded-core-contrib-4cb3874abf4fdeb04337a48a14c765ba9b2269d4.tar.gz |
qemu: Fix CVE-2022-4144
Add patch to fix CVE-2022-4144
Link: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-4144
Signed-off-by: Bhabu Bindu <bhabu.bindu@kpit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch | 99 |
2 files changed, 100 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc index cc9681fb4b..b68be447f1 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://0020-target-ppc-move-xs-n-madd-am-ds-p-xs-n-msub-am-ds-p-.patch \ file://0021-target-ppc-implement-xs-n-maddqp-o-xs-n-msubqp-o.patch \ file://CVE-2022-3165.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-4144.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar" diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..96052a19e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-4144.patch @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +From 6dbbf055148c6f1b7d8a3251a65bd6f3d1e1f622 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= <philmd@linaro.org> +Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2022 21:27:40 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] hw/display/qxl: Avoid buffer overrun in qxl_phys2virt + (CVE-2022-4144) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Have qxl_get_check_slot_offset() return false if the requested +buffer size does not fit within the slot memory region. + +Similarly qxl_phys2virt() now returns NULL in such case, and +qxl_dirty_one_surface() aborts. + +This avoids buffer overrun in the host pointer returned by +memory_region_get_ram_ptr(). + +Fixes: CVE-2022-4144 (out-of-bounds read) +Reported-by: Wenxu Yin (@awxylitol) +Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1336 + +CVE: CVE-2022-4144 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/6dbbf055148c6f1b7d8a3251a65bd6f3d1e1f622] +Comments: Deleted patch hunk in qxl.h,as it contains change +in comments which is not present in current version of qemu + +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> +Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> +Message-Id: <20221128202741.4945-5-philmd@linaro.org> +Signed-off-by: Bhabu Bindu <bhabu.bindu@kpit.com> +--- + hw/display/qxl.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- + 1 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/display/qxl.c b/hw/display/qxl.c +index 231d733250..0b21626aad 100644 +--- a/hw/display/qxl.c ++++ b/hw/display/qxl.c +@@ -1424,11 +1424,13 @@ static void qxl_reset_surfaces(PCIQXLDevice *d) + + /* can be also called from spice server thread context */ + static bool qxl_get_check_slot_offset(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl, +- uint32_t *s, uint64_t *o) ++ uint32_t *s, uint64_t *o, ++ size_t size_requested) + { + uint64_t phys = le64_to_cpu(pqxl); + uint32_t slot = (phys >> (64 - 8)) & 0xff; + uint64_t offset = phys & 0xffffffffffff; ++ uint64_t size_available; + + if (slot >= NUM_MEMSLOTS) { + qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl, "slot too large %d >= %d", slot, +@@ -1452,6 +1454,23 @@ static bool qxl_get_check_slot_offset(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl, + slot, offset, qxl->guest_slots[slot].size); + return false; + } ++ size_available = memory_region_size(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr); ++ if (qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset >= size_available) { ++ qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl, ++ "slot %d offset %"PRIu64" > region size %"PRIu64"\n", ++ slot, qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset, ++ size_available); ++ return false; ++ } ++ size_available -= qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset; ++ if (size_requested > size_available) { ++ qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl, ++ "slot %d offset %"PRIu64" size %zu: " ++ "overrun by %"PRIu64" bytes\n", ++ slot, offset, size_requested, ++ size_requested - size_available); ++ return false; ++ } + + *s = slot; + *o = offset; +@@ -1471,7 +1490,7 @@ void *qxl_phys2virt(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl, int group_id, + offset = le64_to_cpu(pqxl) & 0xffffffffffff; + return (void *)(intptr_t)offset; + case MEMSLOT_GROUP_GUEST: +- if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset)) { ++ if (!qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size)) { + return NULL; + } + ptr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr); +@@ -1937,9 +1956,9 @@ static void qxl_dirty_one_surface(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLPHYSICAL pqxl, + uint32_t slot; + bool rc; + +- rc = qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset); +- assert(rc == true); + size = (uint64_t)height * abs(stride); ++ rc = qxl_get_check_slot_offset(qxl, pqxl, &slot, &offset, size); ++ assert(rc == true); + trace_qxl_surfaces_dirty(qxl->id, offset, size); + qxl_set_dirty(qxl->guest_slots[slot].mr, + qxl->guest_slots[slot].offset + offset, |