wpa-supplicant: Fix CVE-2019-9494 CVE-2019-9495 CVE-2019-9496 CVE-2019-9497 CVE-2019-9498 CVE-2019-9499 CVE-2019-11555

Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>

17 files changed, 2146 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-reassembly-buffer-handling.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-reassembly-buffer-handling.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45e6e87dfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-reassembly-buffer-handling.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From fe76f487e28bdc61940f304f153a954cf36935ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 01:55:32 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] EAP-pwd server: Fix reassembly buffer handling
+
+data->inbuf allocation might fail and if that were to happen, the next
+fragment in the exchange could have resulted in NULL pointer
+dereference. Unexpected fragment with more bit might also be able to
+trigger this. Fix that by explicitly checking for data->inbuf to be
+available before using it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2019-11555
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+index 11bef55..38e2af8 100644
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -912,6 +912,12 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ 	 * the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set
+ 	 */
+ 	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
++		if (!data->inbuf) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++				   "EAP-pwd: No buffer for reassembly");
++			eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
++			return;
++		}
+ 		if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
+ 			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow "
+ 				   "attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)",
+@@ -932,7 +938,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ 	 * last fragment won't have the M bit set (but we're obviously
+ 	 * buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last)
+ 	 */
+-	if (data->in_frag_pos) {
++	if (data->in_frag_pos && data->inbuf) {
+ 		pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
+ 		len = data->in_frag_pos;
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-OpenSSL-Use-constant-time-operations-for-private-big.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-OpenSSL-Use-constant-time-operations-for-private-big.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e64d140c7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-OpenSSL-Use-constant-time-operations-for-private-big.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+From d42c477cc794163a3757956bbffca5cea000923c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 11:43:03 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 01/14] OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private
+ bignums
+
+This helps in reducing measurable timing differences in operations
+involving private information. BoringSSL has removed BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
+and expects specific constant time functions to be called instead, so a
+bit different approach is needed depending on which library is used.
+
+The main operation that needs protection against side channel attacks is
+BN_mod_exp() that depends on private keys (the public key validation
+step in crypto_dh_derive_secret() is an exception that can use the
+faster version since it does not depend on private keys).
+
+crypto_bignum_div() is currently used only in SAE FFC case with not
+safe-prime groups and only with values that do not depend on private
+keys, so it is not critical to protect it.
+
+crypto_bignum_inverse() is currently used only in SAE FFC PWE
+derivation. The additional protection here is targeting only OpenSSL.
+BoringSSL may need conversion to using BN_mod_inverse_blinded().
+
+This is related to CVE-2019-9494 and CVE-2019-9495.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2019-9494
+CVE: CVE-2019-9495
+---
+ src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
+index 9c2ba58..ac53cc8 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
++++ b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
+@@ -607,7 +607,8 @@ int crypto_mod_exp(const u8 *base, size_t base_len,
+ 	    bn_result == NULL)
+ 		goto error;
+ 
+-	if (BN_mod_exp(bn_result, bn_base, bn_exp, bn_modulus, ctx) != 1)
++	if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(bn_result, bn_base, bn_exp, bn_modulus,
++				      ctx, NULL) != 1)
+ 		goto error;
+ 
+ 	*result_len = BN_bn2bin(bn_result, result);
+@@ -1360,8 +1361,9 @@ int crypto_bignum_exptmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
+ 	bnctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ 	if (bnctx == NULL)
+ 		return -1;
+-	res = BN_mod_exp((BIGNUM *) d, (const BIGNUM *) a, (const BIGNUM *) b,
+-			 (const BIGNUM *) c, bnctx);
++	res = BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime((BIGNUM *) d, (const BIGNUM *) a,
++					(const BIGNUM *) b, (const BIGNUM *) c,
++					bnctx, NULL);
+ 	BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ 
+ 	return res ? 0 : -1;
+@@ -1380,6 +1382,11 @@ int crypto_bignum_inverse(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
+ 	bnctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ 	if (bnctx == NULL)
+ 		return -1;
++#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
++	/* TODO: use BN_mod_inverse_blinded() ? */
++#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
++	BN_set_flags((BIGNUM *) a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
+ 	res = BN_mod_inverse((BIGNUM *) c, (const BIGNUM *) a,
+ 			     (const BIGNUM *) b, bnctx);
+ 	BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+@@ -1413,6 +1420,9 @@ int crypto_bignum_div(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
+ 	bnctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ 	if (bnctx == NULL)
+ 		return -1;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
++	BN_set_flags((BIGNUM *) a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
+ 	res = BN_div((BIGNUM *) c, NULL, (const BIGNUM *) a,
+ 		     (const BIGNUM *) b, bnctx);
+ 	BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+@@ -1504,8 +1514,8 @@ int crypto_bignum_legendre(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
+ 	    /* exp = (p-1) / 2 */
+ 	    !BN_sub(exp, (const BIGNUM *) p, BN_value_one()) ||
+ 	    !BN_rshift1(exp, exp) ||
+-	    !BN_mod_exp(tmp, (const BIGNUM *) a, exp, (const BIGNUM *) p,
+-			bnctx))
++	    !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(tmp, (const BIGNUM *) a, exp,
++				       (const BIGNUM *) p, bnctx, NULL))
+ 		goto fail;
+ 
+ 	if (BN_is_word(tmp, 1))
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-Add-helper-functions-for-constant-time-operations.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-Add-helper-functions-for-constant-time-operations.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fd6f2ce158
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-Add-helper-functions-for-constant-time-operations.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+From 6e34f618d37ddbb5854c42e2ad4fca83492fa7b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 18:38:30 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 02/14] Add helper functions for constant time operations
+
+These functions can be used to help implement constant time operations
+for various cryptographic operations that must minimize externally
+observable differences in processing (both in timing and also in
+internal cache use, etc.).
+
+This is related to CVE-2019-9494 and CVE-2019-9495.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2019-9494
+CVE: CVE-2019-9495
+---
+ src/utils/const_time.h | 191 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 191 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 src/utils/const_time.h
+
+diff --git a/src/utils/const_time.h b/src/utils/const_time.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ab8f611
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/src/utils/const_time.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
++/*
++ * Helper functions for constant time operations
++ * Copyright (c) 2019, The Linux Foundation
++ *
++ * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
++ * See README for more details.
++ *
++ * These helper functions can be used to implement logic that needs to minimize
++ * externally visible differences in execution path by avoiding use of branches,
++ * avoiding early termination or other time differences, and forcing same memory
++ * access pattern regardless of values.
++ */
++
++#ifndef CONST_TIME_H
++#define CONST_TIME_H
++
++
++#if defined(__clang__)
++#define NO_UBSAN_UINT_OVERFLOW \
++	__attribute__((no_sanitize("unsigned-integer-overflow")))
++#else
++#define NO_UBSAN_UINT_OVERFLOW
++#endif
++
++
++/**
++ * const_time_fill_msb - Fill all bits with MSB value
++ * @val: Input value
++ * Returns: Value with all the bits set to the MSB of the input val
++ */
++static inline unsigned int const_time_fill_msb(unsigned int val)
++{
++	/* Move the MSB to LSB and multiple by -1 to fill in all bits. */
++	return (val >> (sizeof(val) * 8 - 1)) * ~0U;
++}
++
++
++/* Returns: -1 if val is zero; 0 if val is not zero */
++static inline unsigned int const_time_is_zero(unsigned int val)
++	NO_UBSAN_UINT_OVERFLOW
++{
++	/* Set MSB to 1 for 0 and fill rest of bits with the MSB value */
++	return const_time_fill_msb(~val & (val - 1));
++}
++
++
++/* Returns: -1 if a == b; 0 if a != b */
++static inline unsigned int const_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
++{
++	return const_time_is_zero(a ^ b);
++}
++
++
++/* Returns: -1 if a == b; 0 if a != b */
++static inline u8 const_time_eq_u8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
++{
++	return (u8) const_time_eq(a, b);
++}
++
++
++/**
++ * const_time_eq_bin - Constant time memory comparison
++ * @a: First buffer to compare
++ * @b: Second buffer to compare
++ * @len: Number of octets to compare
++ * Returns: -1 if buffers are equal, 0 if not
++ *
++ * This function is meant for comparing passwords or hash values where
++ * difference in execution time or memory access pattern could provide external
++ * observer information about the location of the difference in the memory
++ * buffers. The return value does not behave like memcmp(), i.e.,
++ * const_time_eq_bin() cannot be used to sort items into a defined order. Unlike
++ * memcmp(), the execution time of const_time_eq_bin() does not depend on the
++ * contents of the compared memory buffers, but only on the total compared
++ * length.
++ */
++static inline unsigned int const_time_eq_bin(const void *a, const void *b,
++					     size_t len)
++{
++	const u8 *aa = a;
++	const u8 *bb = b;
++	size_t i;
++	u8 res = 0;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
++		res |= aa[i] ^ bb[i];
++
++	return const_time_is_zero(res);
++}
++
++
++/**
++ * const_time_select - Constant time unsigned int selection
++ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select
++ * @true_val: Value to select for the true case
++ * @false_val: Value to select for the false case
++ * Returns: true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0
++ */
++static inline unsigned int const_time_select(unsigned int mask,
++					     unsigned int true_val,
++					     unsigned int false_val)
++{
++	return (mask & true_val) | (~mask & false_val);
++}
++
++
++/**
++ * const_time_select_int - Constant time int selection
++ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select
++ * @true_val: Value to select for the true case
++ * @false_val: Value to select for the false case
++ * Returns: true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0
++ */
++static inline int const_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int true_val,
++					int false_val)
++{
++	return (int) const_time_select(mask, (unsigned int) true_val,
++				       (unsigned int) false_val);
++}
++
++
++/**
++ * const_time_select_u8 - Constant time u8 selection
++ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select
++ * @true_val: Value to select for the true case
++ * @false_val: Value to select for the false case
++ * Returns: true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0
++ */
++static inline u8 const_time_select_u8(u8 mask, u8 true_val, u8 false_val)
++{
++	return (u8) const_time_select(mask, true_val, false_val);
++}
++
++
++/**
++ * const_time_select_s8 - Constant time s8 selection
++ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select
++ * @true_val: Value to select for the true case
++ * @false_val: Value to select for the false case
++ * Returns: true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0
++ */
++static inline s8 const_time_select_s8(u8 mask, s8 true_val, s8 false_val)
++{
++	return (s8) const_time_select(mask, (unsigned int) true_val,
++				      (unsigned int) false_val);
++}
++
++
++/**
++ * const_time_select_bin - Constant time binary buffer selection copy
++ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to copy
++ * @true_val: Buffer to copy for the true case
++ * @false_val: Buffer to copy for the false case
++ * @len: Number of octets to copy
++ * @dst: Destination buffer for the copy
++ *
++ * This function copies the specified buffer into the destination buffer using
++ * operations with identical memory access pattern regardless of which buffer
++ * is being copied.
++ */
++static inline void const_time_select_bin(u8 mask, const u8 *true_val,
++					 const u8 *false_val, size_t len,
++					 u8 *dst)
++{
++	size_t i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
++		dst[i] = const_time_select_u8(mask, true_val[i], false_val[i]);
++}
++
++
++static inline int const_time_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t len)
++{
++	const u8 *aa = a;
++	const u8 *bb = b;
++	int diff, res = 0;
++	unsigned int mask;
++
++	if (len == 0)
++		return 0;
++	do {
++		len--;
++		diff = (int) aa[len] - (int) bb[len];
++		mask = const_time_is_zero((unsigned int) diff);
++		res = const_time_select_int(mask, res, diff);
++	} while (len);
++
++	return res;
++}
++
++#endif /* CONST_TIME_H */
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-reassembly-buffer-handling.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-reassembly-buffer-handling.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..95ea809ef2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-reassembly-buffer-handling.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From d2d1a324ce937628e4d9d9999fe113819b7d4478 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 02:21:20 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] EAP-pwd peer: Fix reassembly buffer handling
+
+Unexpected fragment might result in data->inbuf not being allocated
+before processing and that could have resulted in NULL pointer
+dereference. Fix that by explicitly checking for data->inbuf to be
+available before using it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2019-11555
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+index 46894a5..76fcad4 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -932,6 +932,13 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ 	 * buffer and ACK the fragment
+ 	 */
+ 	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
++		if (!data->inbuf) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++				   "EAP-pwd: No buffer for reassembly");
++			ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
++			ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
++			return NULL;
++		}
+ 		data->in_frag_pos += len;
+ 		if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
+ 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack "
+@@ -958,7 +965,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ 	/*
+ 	 * we're buffering and this is the last fragment
+ 	 */
+-	if (data->in_frag_pos) {
++	if (data->in_frag_pos && data->inbuf) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
+ 			   (int) len);
+ 		pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-OpenSSL-Use-constant-time-selection-for-crypto_bignu.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-OpenSSL-Use-constant-time-selection-for-crypto_bignu.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..790041f259
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-OpenSSL-Use-constant-time-selection-for-crypto_bignu.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From c93461c1d98f52681717a088776ab32fd97872b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2019 00:24:12 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 03/14] OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for
+ crypto_bignum_legendre()
+
+Get rid of the branches that depend on the result of the Legendre
+operation. This is needed to avoid leaking information about different
+temporary results in blinding mechanisms.
+
+This is related to CVE-2019-9494 and CVE-2019-9495.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2019-9494
+CVE: CVE-2019-9495
+---
+ src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c | 15 +++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
+index ac53cc8..0f52101 100644
+--- a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
++++ b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ #endif /* CONFIG_ECC */
+ 
+ #include "common.h"
++#include "utils/const_time.h"
+ #include "wpabuf.h"
+ #include "dh_group5.h"
+ #include "sha1.h"
+@@ -1500,6 +1501,7 @@ int crypto_bignum_legendre(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
+ 	BN_CTX *bnctx;
+ 	BIGNUM *exp = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
+ 	int res = -2;
++	unsigned int mask;
+ 
+ 	if (TEST_FAIL())
+ 		return -2;
+@@ -1518,12 +1520,13 @@ int crypto_bignum_legendre(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
+ 				       (const BIGNUM *) p, bnctx, NULL))
+ 		goto fail;
+ 
+-	if (BN_is_word(tmp, 1))
+-		res = 1;
+-	else if (BN_is_zero(tmp))
+-		res = 0;
+-	else
+-		res = -1;
++	/* Return 1 if tmp == 1, 0 if tmp == 0, or -1 otherwise. Need to use
++	 * constant time selection to avoid branches here. */
++	res = -1;
++	mask = const_time_eq(BN_is_word(tmp, 1), 1);
++	res = const_time_select_int(mask, 1, res);
++	mask = const_time_eq(BN_is_zero(tmp), 1);
++	res = const_time_select_int(mask, 0, res);
+ 
+ fail:
+ 	BN_clear_free(tmp);
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-Use-constant-time-and-memory-access-for-find.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-Use-constant-time-and-memory-access-for-find.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..471380c443
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-Use-constant-time-and-memory-access-for-find.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
+From aaf65feac67c3993935634eefe5bc76b9fce03aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 11:59:45 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 04/14] EAP-pwd: Use constant time and memory access for
+ finding the PWE
+
+This algorithm could leak information to external observers in form of
+timing differences or memory access patterns (cache use). While the
+previous implementation had protection against the most visible timing
+differences (looping 40 rounds and masking the legendre operation), it
+did not protect against memory access patterns between the two possible
+code paths in the masking operations. That might be sufficient to allow
+an unprivileged process running on the same device to be able to
+determine which path is being executed through a cache attack and based
+on that, determine information about the used password.
+
+Convert the PWE finding loop to use constant time functions and
+identical memory access path without different branches for the QR/QNR
+cases to minimize possible side-channel information similarly to the
+changes done for SAE authentication. (CVE-2019-9495)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2019-9495
+---
+ src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 187 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ 1 file changed, 99 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+index 02fe01e..e49aaf8 100644
+--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
++++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+@@ -8,11 +8,15 @@
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ #include "common.h"
++#include "utils/const_time.h"
+ #include "crypto/sha256.h"
+ #include "crypto/crypto.h"
+ #include "eap_defs.h"
+ #include "eap_pwd_common.h"
+ 
++#define MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN 66
++
++
+ /* The random function H(x) = HMAC-SHA256(0^32, x) */
+ struct crypto_hash * eap_pwd_h_init(void)
+ {
+@@ -102,6 +106,15 @@ EAP_PWD_group * get_eap_pwd_group(u16 num)
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static void buf_shift_right(u8 *buf, size_t len, size_t bits)
++{
++	size_t i;
++	for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--)
++		buf[i] = (buf[i - 1] << (8 - bits)) | (buf[i] >> bits);
++	buf[0] >>= bits;
++}
++
++
+ /*
+  * compute a "random" secret point on an elliptic curve based
+  * on the password and identities.
+@@ -113,17 +126,27 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
+ 			     const u8 *token)
+ {
+ 	struct crypto_bignum *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL, *one = NULL;
++	struct crypto_bignum *qr_or_qnr = NULL;
++	u8 qr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
++	u8 qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
++	u8 qr_or_qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
++	u8 x_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ 	struct crypto_bignum *tmp1 = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL, *pm1 = NULL;
+ 	struct crypto_hash *hash;
+ 	unsigned char pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr;
+-	int is_odd, ret = 0, check, found = 0;
+-	size_t primebytelen, primebitlen;
+-	struct crypto_bignum *x_candidate = NULL, *rnd = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
++	int ret = 0, check, res;
++	u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_*
++		       * mask */
++	size_t primebytelen = 0, primebitlen;
++	struct crypto_bignum *x_candidate = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ 	const struct crypto_bignum *prime;
++	u8 mask, found_ctr = 0, is_odd = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (grp->pwe)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
++	os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin));
++
+ 	prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(grp->group);
+ 	cofactor = crypto_bignum_init();
+ 	grp->pwe = crypto_ec_point_init(grp->group);
+@@ -152,8 +175,6 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
+ 
+ 	/* get a random quadratic residue and nonresidue */
+ 	while (!qr || !qnr) {
+-		int res;
+-
+ 		if (crypto_bignum_rand(tmp1, prime) < 0)
+ 			goto fail;
+ 		res = crypto_bignum_legendre(tmp1, prime);
+@@ -167,6 +188,11 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
+ 		if (!tmp1)
+ 			goto fail;
+ 	}
++	if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(qr, qr_bin, sizeof(qr_bin),
++				 primebytelen) < 0 ||
++	    crypto_bignum_to_bin(qnr, qnr_bin, sizeof(qnr_bin),
++				 primebytelen) < 0)
++		goto fail;
+ 
+ 	os_memset(prfbuf, 0, primebytelen);
+ 	ctr = 0;
+@@ -194,17 +220,16 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
+ 		eap_pwd_h_update(hash, &ctr, sizeof(ctr));
+ 		eap_pwd_h_final(hash, pwe_digest);
+ 
+-		crypto_bignum_deinit(rnd, 1);
+-		rnd = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
+-		if (!rnd) {
+-			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create rnd");
+-			goto fail;
+-		}
++		is_odd = const_time_select_u8(
++			found, is_odd, pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN - 1] & 0x01);
+ 		if (eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
+ 				(u8 *) "EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking",
+ 				os_strlen("EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking"),
+ 				prfbuf, primebitlen) < 0)
+ 			goto fail;
++		if (primebitlen % 8)
++			buf_shift_right(prfbuf, primebytelen,
++					8 - primebitlen % 8);
+ 
+ 		crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
+ 		x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(prfbuf, primebytelen);
+@@ -214,24 +239,13 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
+ 			goto fail;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		/*
+-		 * eap_pwd_kdf() returns a string of bits 0..primebitlen but
+-		 * BN_bin2bn will treat that string of bits as a big endian
+-		 * number. If the primebitlen is not an even multiple of 8
+-		 * then excessive bits-- those _after_ primebitlen-- so now
+-		 * we have to shift right the amount we masked off.
+-		 */
+-		if ((primebitlen % 8) &&
+-		    crypto_bignum_rshift(x_candidate,
+-					 (8 - (primebitlen % 8)),
+-					 x_candidate) < 0)
+-			goto fail;
+-
+ 		if (crypto_bignum_cmp(x_candidate, prime) >= 0)
+ 			continue;
+ 
+-		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate",
+-			    prfbuf, primebytelen);
++		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate",
++				prfbuf, primebytelen);
++		const_time_select_bin(found, x_bin, prfbuf, primebytelen,
++				      x_bin);
+ 
+ 		/*
+ 		 * compute y^2 using the equation of the curve
+@@ -261,13 +275,15 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
+ 		 * Flip a coin, multiply by the random quadratic residue or the
+ 		 * random quadratic nonresidue and record heads or tails.
+ 		 */
+-		if (crypto_bignum_is_odd(tmp1)) {
+-			crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, qr, prime, tmp2);
+-			check = 1;
+-		} else {
+-			crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, qnr, prime, tmp2);
+-			check = -1;
+-		}
++		mask = const_time_eq_u8(crypto_bignum_is_odd(tmp1), 1);
++		check = const_time_select_s8(mask, 1, -1);
++		const_time_select_bin(mask, qr_bin, qnr_bin, primebytelen,
++				      qr_or_qnr_bin);
++		crypto_bignum_deinit(qr_or_qnr, 1);
++		qr_or_qnr = crypto_bignum_init_set(qr_or_qnr_bin, primebytelen);
++		if (!qr_or_qnr ||
++		    crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, qr_or_qnr, prime, tmp2) < 0)
++			goto fail;
+ 
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Now it's safe to do legendre, if check is 1 then it's
+@@ -275,59 +291,12 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
+ 		 * change result), if check is -1 then it's the opposite test
+ 		 * (multiplying a qr by qnr would make a qnr).
+ 		 */
+-		if (crypto_bignum_legendre(tmp2, prime) == check) {
+-			if (found == 1)
+-				continue;
+-
+-			/* need to unambiguously identify the solution */
+-			is_odd = crypto_bignum_is_odd(rnd);
+-
+-			/*
+-			 * We know x_candidate is a quadratic residue so set
+-			 * it here.
+-			 */
+-			if (crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(grp->group, grp->pwe,
+-							  x_candidate,
+-							  is_odd) != 0) {
+-				wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+-					   "EAP-pwd: Could not solve for y");
+-				continue;
+-			}
+-
+-			/*
+-			 * If there's a solution to the equation then the point
+-			 * must be on the curve so why check again explicitly?
+-			 * OpenSSL code says this is required by X9.62. We're
+-			 * not X9.62 but it can't hurt just to be sure.
+-			 */
+-			if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(grp->group,
+-							 grp->pwe)) {
+-				wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+-					   "EAP-pwd: point is not on curve");
+-				continue;
+-			}
+-
+-			if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
+-				/* make sure the point is not in a small
+-				 * sub-group */
+-				if (crypto_ec_point_mul(grp->group, grp->pwe,
+-							cofactor,
+-							grp->pwe) != 0) {
+-					wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+-						   "EAP-pwd: cannot multiply generator by order");
+-					continue;
+-				}
+-				if (crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(grp->group,
+-								   grp->pwe)) {
+-					wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+-						   "EAP-pwd: point is at infinity");
+-					continue;
+-				}
+-			}
+-			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+-				   "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %d tries", ctr);
+-			found = 1;
+-		}
++		res = crypto_bignum_legendre(tmp2, prime);
++		if (res == -2)
++			goto fail;
++		mask = const_time_eq(res, check);
++		found_ctr = const_time_select_u8(found, found_ctr, ctr);
++		found |= mask;
+ 	}
+ 	if (found == 0) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+@@ -335,6 +304,44 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
+ 			   num);
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
++
++	/*
++	 * We know x_candidate is a quadratic residue so set it here.
++	 */
++	crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
++	x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(x_bin, primebytelen);
++	if (!x_candidate ||
++	    crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(grp->group, grp->pwe, x_candidate,
++					  is_odd) != 0) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Could not solve for y");
++		goto fail;
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * If there's a solution to the equation then the point must be on the
++	 * curve so why check again explicitly? OpenSSL code says this is
++	 * required by X9.62. We're not X9.62 but it can't hurt just to be sure.
++	 */
++	if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(grp->group, grp->pwe)) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is not on curve");
++		goto fail;
++	}
++
++	if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
++		/* make sure the point is not in a small sub-group */
++		if (crypto_ec_point_mul(grp->group, grp->pwe, cofactor,
++					grp->pwe) != 0) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++				   "EAP-pwd: cannot multiply generator by order");
++			goto fail;
++		}
++		if (crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(grp->group, grp->pwe)) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is at infinity");
++			goto fail;
++		}
++	}
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %02d tries", found_ctr);
++
+ 	if (0) {
+  fail:
+ 		crypto_ec_point_deinit(grp->pwe, 1);
+@@ -344,14 +351,18 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
+ 	/* cleanliness and order.... */
+ 	crypto_bignum_deinit(cofactor, 1);
+ 	crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
+-	crypto_bignum_deinit(rnd, 1);
+ 	crypto_bignum_deinit(pm1, 0);
+ 	crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp1, 1);
+ 	crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp2, 1);
+ 	crypto_bignum_deinit(qr, 1);
+ 	crypto_bignum_deinit(qnr, 1);
++	crypto_bignum_deinit(qr_or_qnr, 1);
+ 	crypto_bignum_deinit(one, 0);
+-	os_free(prfbuf);
++	bin_clear_free(prfbuf, primebytelen);
++	os_memset(qr_bin, 0, sizeof(qr_bin));
++	os_memset(qnr_bin, 0, sizeof(qnr_bin));
++	os_memset(qr_or_qnr_bin, 0, sizeof(qr_or_qnr_bin));
++	os_memset(pwe_digest, 0, sizeof(pwe_digest));
+ 
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0005-SAE-Minimize-timing-differences-in-PWE-derivation.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0005-SAE-Minimize-timing-differences-in-PWE-derivation.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6a567c5fb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0005-SAE-Minimize-timing-differences-in-PWE-derivation.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+From 6513db3e96c43c2e36805cf5ead349765d18eaf7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 13:05:09 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 05/14] SAE: Minimize timing differences in PWE derivation
+
+The QR test result can provide information about the password to an
+attacker, so try to minimize differences in how the
+sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc() result is used. (CVE-2019-9494)
+
+Use heap memory for the dummy password to allow the same password length
+to be used even with long passwords.
+
+Use constant time selection functions to track the real vs. dummy
+variables so that the exact same operations can be performed for both QR
+test results.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2019-9494
+---
+ src/common/sae.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
+index 8129a7c..d55323b 100644
+--- a/src/common/sae.c
++++ b/src/common/sae.c
+@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
+ #include "includes.h"
+ 
+ #include "common.h"
++#include "utils/const_time.h"
+ #include "crypto/crypto.h"
+ #include "crypto/sha256.h"
+ #include "crypto/random.h"
+@@ -292,15 +293,12 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
+ 				 const u8 *prime,
+ 				 const struct crypto_bignum *qr,
+ 				 const struct crypto_bignum *qnr,
+-				 struct crypto_bignum **ret_x_cand)
++				 u8 *pwd_value)
+ {
+-	u8 pwd_value[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ 	struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr, *x_cand;
+ 	int res;
+ 	size_t bits;
+ 
+-	*ret_x_cand = NULL;
+-
+ 	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed", pwd_seed, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
+ 
+ 	/* pwd-value = KDF-z(pwd-seed, "SAE Hunting and Pecking", p) */
+@@ -309,7 +307,7 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
+ 			    prime, sae->tmp->prime_len, pwd_value, bits) < 0)
+ 		return -1;
+ 	if (bits % 8)
+-		buf_shift_right(pwd_value, sizeof(pwd_value), 8 - bits % 8);
++		buf_shift_right(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len, 8 - bits % 8);
+ 	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value",
+ 			pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
+ 
+@@ -320,20 +318,13 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
+ 	if (!x_cand)
+ 		return -1;
+ 	y_sqr = crypto_ec_point_compute_y_sqr(sae->tmp->ec, x_cand);
+-	if (!y_sqr) {
+-		crypto_bignum_deinit(x_cand, 1);
++	crypto_bignum_deinit(x_cand, 1);
++	if (!y_sqr)
+ 		return -1;
+-	}
+ 
+ 	res = is_quadratic_residue_blind(sae, prime, bits, qr, qnr, y_sqr);
+ 	crypto_bignum_deinit(y_sqr, 1);
+-	if (res <= 0) {
+-		crypto_bignum_deinit(x_cand, 1);
+-		return res;
+-	}
+-
+-	*ret_x_cand = x_cand;
+-	return 1;
++	return res;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -454,25 +445,30 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
+ 	const u8 *addr[3];
+ 	size_t len[3];
+ 	size_t num_elem;
+-	u8 dummy_password[32];
+-	size_t dummy_password_len;
++	u8 *dummy_password, *tmp_password;
+ 	int pwd_seed_odd = 0;
+ 	u8 prime[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ 	size_t prime_len;
+-	struct crypto_bignum *x = NULL, *qr, *qnr;
++	struct crypto_bignum *x = NULL, *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL;
++	u8 x_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
++	u8 x_cand_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ 	size_t bits;
+-	int res;
++	int res = -1;
++	u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_*
++		       * mask */
+ 
+-	dummy_password_len = password_len;
+-	if (dummy_password_len > sizeof(dummy_password))
+-		dummy_password_len = sizeof(dummy_password);
+-	if (random_get_bytes(dummy_password, dummy_password_len) < 0)
+-		return -1;
++	os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin));
++
++	dummy_password = os_malloc(password_len);
++	tmp_password = os_malloc(password_len);
++	if (!dummy_password || !tmp_password ||
++	    random_get_bytes(dummy_password, password_len) < 0)
++		goto fail;
+ 
+ 	prime_len = sae->tmp->prime_len;
+ 	if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(sae->tmp->prime, prime, sizeof(prime),
+ 				 prime_len) < 0)
+-		return -1;
++		goto fail;
+ 	bits = crypto_ec_prime_len_bits(sae->tmp->ec);
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -481,7 +477,7 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
+ 	 */
+ 	if (get_random_qr_qnr(prime, prime_len, sae->tmp->prime, bits,
+ 			      &qr, &qnr) < 0)
+-		return -1;
++		goto fail;
+ 
+ 	wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password",
+ 			      password, password_len);
+@@ -497,7 +493,7 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
+ 	 */
+ 	sae_pwd_seed_key(addr1, addr2, addrs);
+ 
+-	addr[0] = password;
++	addr[0] = tmp_password;
+ 	len[0] = password_len;
+ 	num_elem = 1;
+ 	if (identifier) {
+@@ -514,9 +510,8 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
+ 	 * attacks that attempt to determine the number of iterations required
+ 	 * in the loop.
+ 	 */
+-	for (counter = 1; counter <= k || !x; counter++) {
++	for (counter = 1; counter <= k || !found; counter++) {
+ 		u8 pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
+-		struct crypto_bignum *x_cand;
+ 
+ 		if (counter > 200) {
+ 			/* This should not happen in practice */
+@@ -524,36 +519,45 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: counter = %u", counter);
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: counter = %03u", counter);
++		const_time_select_bin(found, dummy_password, password,
++				      password_len, tmp_password);
+ 		if (hmac_sha256_vector(addrs, sizeof(addrs), num_elem,
+ 				       addr, len, pwd_seed) < 0)
+ 			break;
+ 
+ 		res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(sae, pwd_seed,
+-					    prime, qr, qnr, &x_cand);
++					    prime, qr, qnr, x_cand_bin);
++		const_time_select_bin(found, x_bin, x_cand_bin, prime_len,
++				      x_bin);
++		pwd_seed_odd = const_time_select_u8(
++			found, pwd_seed_odd,
++			pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN - 1] & 0x01);
++		os_memset(pwd_seed, 0, sizeof(pwd_seed));
+ 		if (res < 0)
+ 			goto fail;
+-		if (res > 0 && !x) {
+-			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+-				   "SAE: Selected pwd-seed with counter %u",
+-				   counter);
+-			x = x_cand;
+-			pwd_seed_odd = pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN - 1] & 0x01;
+-			os_memset(pwd_seed, 0, sizeof(pwd_seed));
++		/* Need to minimize differences in handling res == 0 and 1 here
++		 * to avoid differences in timing and instruction cache access,
++		 * so use const_time_select_*() to make local copies of the
++		 * values based on whether this loop iteration was the one that
++		 * found the pwd-seed/x. */
++
++		/* found is 0 or 0xff here and res is 0 or 1. Bitwise OR of them
++		 * (with res converted to 0/0xff) handles this in constant time.
++		 */
++		found |= res * 0xff;
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed result %d found=0x%02x",
++			   res, found);
++	}
+ 
+-			/*
+-			 * Use a dummy password for the following rounds, if
+-			 * any.
+-			 */
+-			addr[0] = dummy_password;
+-			len[0] = dummy_password_len;
+-		} else if (res > 0) {
+-			crypto_bignum_deinit(x_cand, 1);
+-		}
++	if (!found) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not generate PWE");
++		res = -1;
++		goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
++	x = crypto_bignum_init_set(x_bin, prime_len);
+ 	if (!x) {
+-		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not generate PWE");
+ 		res = -1;
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+@@ -566,7 +570,6 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
+ 		res = crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(sae->tmp->ec,
+ 						    sae->tmp->pwe_ecc, x,
+ 						    pwd_seed_odd);
+-	crypto_bignum_deinit(x, 1);
+ 	if (res < 0) {
+ 		/*
+ 		 * This should not happen since we already checked that there
+@@ -578,6 +581,11 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
+ fail:
+ 	crypto_bignum_deinit(qr, 0);
+ 	crypto_bignum_deinit(qnr, 0);
++	os_free(dummy_password);
++	bin_clear_free(tmp_password, password_len);
++	crypto_bignum_deinit(x, 1);
++	os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin));
++	os_memset(x_cand_bin, 0, sizeof(x_cand_bin));
+ 
+ 	return res;
+ }
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0006-SAE-Avoid-branches-in-is_quadratic_residue_blind.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0006-SAE-Avoid-branches-in-is_quadratic_residue_blind.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5209559659
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0006-SAE-Avoid-branches-in-is_quadratic_residue_blind.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+From 362704dda04507e7ebb8035122e83d9f0ae7c320 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 19:34:38 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 06/14] SAE: Avoid branches in is_quadratic_residue_blind()
+
+Make the non-failure path in the function proceed without branches based
+on r_odd and in constant time to minimize risk of observable differences
+in timing or cache use. (CVE-2019-9494)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2019-9494
+---
+ src/common/sae.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
+index d55323b..5df9b95 100644
+--- a/src/common/sae.c
++++ b/src/common/sae.c
+@@ -232,12 +232,14 @@ get_rand_1_to_p_1(const u8 *prime, size_t prime_len, size_t prime_bits,
+ 
+ static int is_quadratic_residue_blind(struct sae_data *sae,
+ 				      const u8 *prime, size_t bits,
+-				      const struct crypto_bignum *qr,
+-				      const struct crypto_bignum *qnr,
++				      const u8 *qr, const u8 *qnr,
+ 				      const struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr)
+ {
+-	struct crypto_bignum *r, *num;
++	struct crypto_bignum *r, *num, *qr_or_qnr = NULL;
+ 	int r_odd, check, res = -1;
++	u8 qr_or_qnr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
++	size_t prime_len = sae->tmp->prime_len;
++	unsigned int mask;
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Use the blinding technique to mask y_sqr while determining
+@@ -248,7 +250,7 @@ static int is_quadratic_residue_blind(struct sae_data *sae,
+ 	 * r = a random number between 1 and p-1, inclusive
+ 	 * num = (v * r * r) modulo p
+ 	 */
+-	r = get_rand_1_to_p_1(prime, sae->tmp->prime_len, bits, &r_odd);
++	r = get_rand_1_to_p_1(prime, prime_len, bits, &r_odd);
+ 	if (!r)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+@@ -258,41 +260,45 @@ static int is_quadratic_residue_blind(struct sae_data *sae,
+ 	    crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, r, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0)
+ 		goto fail;
+ 
+-	if (r_odd) {
+-		/*
+-		 * num = (num * qr) module p
+-		 * LGR(num, p) = 1 ==> quadratic residue
+-		 */
+-		if (crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, qr, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0)
+-			goto fail;
+-		check = 1;
+-	} else {
+-		/*
+-		 * num = (num * qnr) module p
+-		 * LGR(num, p) = -1 ==> quadratic residue
+-		 */
+-		if (crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, qnr, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0)
+-			goto fail;
+-		check = -1;
+-	}
++	/*
++	 * Need to minimize differences in handling different cases, so try to
++	 * avoid branches and timing differences.
++	 *
++	 * If r_odd:
++	 * num = (num * qr) module p
++	 * LGR(num, p) = 1 ==> quadratic residue
++	 * else:
++	 * num = (num * qnr) module p
++	 * LGR(num, p) = -1 ==> quadratic residue
++	 */
++	mask = const_time_is_zero(r_odd);
++	const_time_select_bin(mask, qnr, qr, prime_len, qr_or_qnr_bin);
++	qr_or_qnr = crypto_bignum_init_set(qr_or_qnr_bin, prime_len);
++	if (!qr_or_qnr ||
++	    crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, qr_or_qnr, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0)
++		goto fail;
++	/* r_odd is 0 or 1; branchless version of check = r_odd ? 1 : -1, */
++	check = const_time_select_int(mask, -1, 1);
+ 
+ 	res = crypto_bignum_legendre(num, sae->tmp->prime);
+ 	if (res == -2) {
+ 		res = -1;
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+-	res = res == check;
++	/* branchless version of res = res == check
++	 * (res is -1, 0, or 1; check is -1 or 1) */
++	mask = const_time_eq(res, check);
++	res = const_time_select_int(mask, 1, 0);
+ fail:
+ 	crypto_bignum_deinit(num, 1);
+ 	crypto_bignum_deinit(r, 1);
++	crypto_bignum_deinit(qr_or_qnr, 1);
+ 	return res;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
+-				 const u8 *prime,
+-				 const struct crypto_bignum *qr,
+-				 const struct crypto_bignum *qnr,
++				 const u8 *prime, const u8 *qr, const u8 *qnr,
+ 				 u8 *pwd_value)
+ {
+ 	struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr, *x_cand;
+@@ -452,6 +458,8 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
+ 	struct crypto_bignum *x = NULL, *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL;
+ 	u8 x_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ 	u8 x_cand_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
++	u8 qr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
++	u8 qnr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ 	size_t bits;
+ 	int res = -1;
+ 	u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_*
+@@ -476,7 +484,9 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
+ 	 * (qnr) modulo p for blinding purposes during the loop.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (get_random_qr_qnr(prime, prime_len, sae->tmp->prime, bits,
+-			      &qr, &qnr) < 0)
++			      &qr, &qnr) < 0 ||
++	    crypto_bignum_to_bin(qr, qr_bin, sizeof(qr_bin), prime_len) < 0 ||
++	    crypto_bignum_to_bin(qnr, qnr_bin, sizeof(qnr_bin), prime_len) < 0)
+ 		goto fail;
+ 
+ 	wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password",
+@@ -527,7 +537,7 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
+ 			break;
+ 
+ 		res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(sae, pwd_seed,
+-					    prime, qr, qnr, x_cand_bin);
++					    prime, qr_bin, qnr_bin, x_cand_bin);
+ 		const_time_select_bin(found, x_bin, x_cand_bin, prime_len,
+ 				      x_bin);
+ 		pwd_seed_odd = const_time_select_u8(
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0007-SAE-Mask-timing-of-MODP-groups-22-23-24.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0007-SAE-Mask-timing-of-MODP-groups-22-23-24.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6cfa7220e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0007-SAE-Mask-timing-of-MODP-groups-22-23-24.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+From 90839597cc4016b33f00055b12d59174c62770a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Sat, 2 Mar 2019 12:24:09 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 07/14] SAE: Mask timing of MODP groups 22, 23, 24
+
+These groups have significant probability of coming up with pwd-value
+that is equal or greater than the prime and as such, need for going
+through the PWE derivation loop multiple times. This can result in
+sufficient timing different to allow an external observer to determine
+how many rounds are needed and that can leak information about the used
+password.
+
+Force at least 40 loop rounds for these MODP groups similarly to the ECC
+group design to mask timing. This behavior is not described in IEEE Std
+802.11-2016 for SAE, but it does not result in different values (i.e.,
+only different timing), so such implementation specific countermeasures
+can be done without breaking interoperability with other implementation.
+
+Note: These MODP groups 22, 23, and 24 are not considered sufficiently
+strong to be used with SAE (or more or less anything else). As such,
+they should never be enabled in runtime configuration for any production
+use cases. These changes to introduce additional protection to mask
+timing is only for completeness of implementation and not an indication
+that these groups should be used.
+
+This is related to CVE-2019-9494.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2019-9494
+---
+ src/common/sae.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
+index 5df9b95..75b1b4a 100644
+--- a/src/common/sae.c
++++ b/src/common/sae.c
+@@ -601,22 +601,27 @@ fail:
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static int sae_modp_group_require_masking(int group)
++{
++	/* Groups for which pwd-value is likely to be >= p frequently */
++	return group == 22 || group == 23 || group == 24;
++}
++
++
+ static int sae_derive_pwe_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
+ 			      const u8 *addr2, const u8 *password,
+ 			      size_t password_len, const char *identifier)
+ {
+-	u8 counter;
++	u8 counter, k;
+ 	u8 addrs[2 * ETH_ALEN];
+ 	const u8 *addr[3];
+ 	size_t len[3];
+ 	size_t num_elem;
+ 	int found = 0;
++	struct crypto_bignum *pwe = NULL;
+ 
+-	if (sae->tmp->pwe_ffc == NULL) {
+-		sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = crypto_bignum_init();
+-		if (sae->tmp->pwe_ffc == NULL)
+-			return -1;
+-	}
++	crypto_bignum_deinit(sae->tmp->pwe_ffc, 1);
++	sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = NULL;
+ 
+ 	wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password",
+ 			      password, password_len);
+@@ -640,7 +645,9 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
+ 	len[num_elem] = sizeof(counter);
+ 	num_elem++;
+ 
+-	for (counter = 1; !found; counter++) {
++	k = sae_modp_group_require_masking(sae->group) ? 40 : 1;
++
++	for (counter = 1; counter <= k || !found; counter++) {
+ 		u8 pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
+ 		int res;
+ 
+@@ -650,19 +657,30 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: counter = %u", counter);
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: counter = %02u", counter);
+ 		if (hmac_sha256_vector(addrs, sizeof(addrs), num_elem,
+ 				       addr, len, pwd_seed) < 0)
+ 			break;
+-		res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(sae, pwd_seed, sae->tmp->pwe_ffc);
++		if (!pwe) {
++			pwe = crypto_bignum_init();
++			if (!pwe)
++				break;
++		}
++		res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(sae, pwd_seed, pwe);
+ 		if (res < 0)
+ 			break;
+ 		if (res > 0) {
+-			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Use this PWE");
+ 			found = 1;
++			if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ffc) {
++				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Use this PWE");
++				sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = pwe;
++				pwe = NULL;
++			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
++	crypto_bignum_deinit(pwe, 1);
++
+ 	return found ? 0 : -1;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0008-SAE-Use-const_time-selection-for-PWE-in-FFC.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0008-SAE-Use-const_time-selection-for-PWE-in-FFC.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7b8616a66d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0008-SAE-Use-const_time-selection-for-PWE-in-FFC.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+From f8f20717f87eff1f025f48ed585c7684debacf72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Sat, 2 Mar 2019 12:45:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 08/14] SAE: Use const_time selection for PWE in FFC
+
+This is an initial step towards making the FFC case use strictly
+constant time operations similarly to the ECC case.
+sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc() does not yet have constant time behavior,
+though.
+
+This is related to CVE-2019-9494.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2019-9494
+---
+ src/common/sae.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
+index 75b1b4a..fa9a145 100644
+--- a/src/common/sae.c
++++ b/src/common/sae.c
+@@ -612,17 +612,28 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
+ 			      const u8 *addr2, const u8 *password,
+ 			      size_t password_len, const char *identifier)
+ {
+-	u8 counter, k;
++	u8 counter, k, sel_counter = 0;
+ 	u8 addrs[2 * ETH_ALEN];
+ 	const u8 *addr[3];
+ 	size_t len[3];
+ 	size_t num_elem;
+-	int found = 0;
+-	struct crypto_bignum *pwe = NULL;
++	u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_*
++		       * mask */
++	u8 mask;
++	struct crypto_bignum *pwe;
++	size_t prime_len = sae->tmp->prime_len * 8;
++	u8 *pwe_buf;
+ 
+ 	crypto_bignum_deinit(sae->tmp->pwe_ffc, 1);
+ 	sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = NULL;
+ 
++	/* Allocate a buffer to maintain selected and candidate PWE for constant
++	 * time selection. */
++	pwe_buf = os_zalloc(prime_len * 2);
++	pwe = crypto_bignum_init();
++	if (!pwe_buf || !pwe)
++		goto fail;
++
+ 	wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password",
+ 			      password, password_len);
+ 
+@@ -661,27 +672,33 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
+ 		if (hmac_sha256_vector(addrs, sizeof(addrs), num_elem,
+ 				       addr, len, pwd_seed) < 0)
+ 			break;
+-		if (!pwe) {
+-			pwe = crypto_bignum_init();
+-			if (!pwe)
+-				break;
+-		}
+ 		res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(sae, pwd_seed, pwe);
++		/* res is -1 for fatal failure, 0 if a valid PWE was not found,
++		 * or 1 if a valid PWE was found. */
+ 		if (res < 0)
+ 			break;
+-		if (res > 0) {
+-			found = 1;
+-			if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ffc) {
+-				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Use this PWE");
+-				sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = pwe;
+-				pwe = NULL;
+-			}
+-		}
++		/* Store the candidate PWE into the second half of pwe_buf and
++		 * the selected PWE in the beginning of pwe_buf using constant
++		 * time selection. */
++		if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(pwe, pwe_buf + prime_len, prime_len,
++					 prime_len) < 0)
++			break;
++		const_time_select_bin(found, pwe_buf, pwe_buf + prime_len,
++				      prime_len, pwe_buf);
++		sel_counter = const_time_select_u8(found, sel_counter, counter);
++		mask = const_time_eq_u8(res, 1);
++		found = const_time_select_u8(found, found, mask);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	crypto_bignum_deinit(pwe, 1);
++	if (!found)
++		goto fail;
+ 
+-	return found ? 0 : -1;
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Use PWE from counter = %02u", sel_counter);
++	sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwe_buf, prime_len);
++fail:
++	crypto_bignum_deinit(pwe, 1);
++	bin_clear_free(pwe_buf, prime_len * 2);
++	return sae->tmp->pwe_ffc ? 0 : -1;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0009-SAE-Use-constant-time-operations-in-sae_test_pwd_see.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0009-SAE-Use-constant-time-operations-in-sae_test_pwd_see.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d2ae8188e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0009-SAE-Use-constant-time-operations-in-sae_test_pwd_see.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+From cff138b0747fa39765cbc641b66cfa5d7f1735d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Sat, 2 Mar 2019 16:05:56 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 09/14] SAE: Use constant time operations in
+ sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc()
+
+Try to avoid showing externally visible timing or memory access
+differences regardless of whether the derived pwd-value is smaller than
+the group prime.
+
+This is related to CVE-2019-9494.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2019-9494
+---
+ src/common/sae.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
+index fa9a145..eaf825d 100644
+--- a/src/common/sae.c
++++ b/src/common/sae.c
+@@ -334,14 +334,17 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++/* Returns -1 on fatal failure, 0 if PWE cannot be derived from the provided
++ * pwd-seed, or 1 if a valid PWE was derived from pwd-seed. */
+ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
+ 				 struct crypto_bignum *pwe)
+ {
+ 	u8 pwd_value[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN];
+ 	size_t bits = sae->tmp->prime_len * 8;
+ 	u8 exp[1];
+-	struct crypto_bignum *a, *b;
+-	int res;
++	struct crypto_bignum *a, *b = NULL;
++	int res, is_val;
++	u8 pwd_value_valid;
+ 
+ 	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed", pwd_seed, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
+ 
+@@ -353,16 +356,29 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
+ 	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value", pwd_value,
+ 			sae->tmp->prime_len);
+ 
+-	if (os_memcmp(pwd_value, sae->tmp->dh->prime, sae->tmp->prime_len) >= 0)
+-	{
+-		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value >= p");
+-		return 0;
+-	}
++	/* Check whether pwd-value < p */
++	res = const_time_memcmp(pwd_value, sae->tmp->dh->prime,
++				sae->tmp->prime_len);
++	/* pwd-value >= p is invalid, so res is < 0 for the valid cases and
++	 * the negative sign can be used to fill the mask for constant time
++	 * selection */
++	pwd_value_valid = const_time_fill_msb(res);
++
++	/* If pwd-value >= p, force pwd-value to be < p and perform the
++	 * calculations anyway to hide timing difference. The derived PWE will
++	 * be ignored in that case. */
++	pwd_value[0] = const_time_select_u8(pwd_value_valid, pwd_value[0], 0);
+ 
+ 	/* PWE = pwd-value^((p-1)/r) modulo p */
+ 
++	res = -1;
+ 	a = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
++	if (!a)
++		goto fail;
+ 
++	/* This is an optimization based on the used group that does not depend
++	 * on the password in any way, so it is fine to use separate branches
++	 * for this step without constant time operations. */
+ 	if (sae->tmp->dh->safe_prime) {
+ 		/*
+ 		 * r = (p-1)/2 for the group used here, so this becomes:
+@@ -376,33 +392,34 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
+ 		b = crypto_bignum_init_set(exp, sizeof(exp));
+ 		if (b == NULL ||
+ 		    crypto_bignum_sub(sae->tmp->prime, b, b) < 0 ||
+-		    crypto_bignum_div(b, sae->tmp->order, b) < 0) {
+-			crypto_bignum_deinit(b, 0);
+-			b = NULL;
+-		}
++		    crypto_bignum_div(b, sae->tmp->order, b) < 0)
++			goto fail;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
+-		res = -1;
+-	else
+-		res = crypto_bignum_exptmod(a, b, sae->tmp->prime, pwe);
+-
+-	crypto_bignum_deinit(a, 0);
+-	crypto_bignum_deinit(b, 0);
++	if (!b)
++		goto fail;
+ 
+-	if (res < 0) {
+-		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Failed to calculate PWE");
+-		return -1;
+-	}
++	res = crypto_bignum_exptmod(a, b, sae->tmp->prime, pwe);
++	if (res < 0)
++		goto fail;
+ 
+-	/* if (PWE > 1) --> found */
+-	if (crypto_bignum_is_zero(pwe) || crypto_bignum_is_one(pwe)) {
+-		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE <= 1");
+-		return 0;
+-	}
++	/* There were no fatal errors in calculations, so determine the return
++	 * value using constant time operations. We get here for number of
++	 * invalid cases which are cleared here after having performed all the
++	 * computation. PWE is valid if pwd-value was less than prime and
++	 * PWE > 1. Start with pwd-value check first and then use constant time
++	 * operations to clear res to 0 if PWE is 0 or 1.
++	 */
++	res = const_time_select_u8(pwd_value_valid, 1, 0);
++	is_val = crypto_bignum_is_zero(pwe);
++	res = const_time_select_u8(const_time_is_zero(is_val), res, 0);
++	is_val = crypto_bignum_is_one(pwe);
++	res = const_time_select_u8(const_time_is_zero(is_val), res, 0);
+ 
+-	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE found");
+-	return 1;
++fail:
++	crypto_bignum_deinit(a, 1);
++	crypto_bignum_deinit(b, 1);
++	return res;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0010-SAE-Fix-confirm-message-validation-in-error-cases.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0010-SAE-Fix-confirm-message-validation-in-error-cases.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9d2c6983d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0010-SAE-Fix-confirm-message-validation-in-error-cases.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From ac8fa9ef198640086cf2ce7c94673be2b6a018a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 23:43:25 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 10/14] SAE: Fix confirm message validation in error cases
+
+Explicitly verify that own and peer commit scalar/element are available
+when trying to check SAE confirm message. It could have been possible to
+hit a NULL pointer dereference if the peer element could not have been
+parsed. (CVE-2019-9496)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2019-9496
+---
+ src/common/sae.c | 14 +++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
+index eaf825d..5a50294 100644
+--- a/src/common/sae.c
++++ b/src/common/sae.c
+@@ -1487,23 +1487,31 @@ int sae_check_confirm(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *data, size_t len)
+ 
+ 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: peer-send-confirm %u", WPA_GET_LE16(data));
+ 
+-	if (sae->tmp == NULL) {
++	if (!sae->tmp || !sae->peer_commit_scalar ||
++	    !sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Temporary data not yet available");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (sae->tmp->ec)
++	if (sae->tmp->ec) {
++		if (!sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ecc ||
++		    !sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ecc)
++			return -1;
+ 		sae_cn_confirm_ecc(sae, data, sae->peer_commit_scalar,
+ 				   sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ecc,
+ 				   sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar,
+ 				   sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ecc,
+ 				   verifier);
+-	else
++	} else {
++		if (!sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ffc ||
++		    !sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ffc)
++			return -1;
+ 		sae_cn_confirm_ffc(sae, data, sae->peer_commit_scalar,
+ 				   sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ffc,
+ 				   sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar,
+ 				   sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ffc,
+ 				   verifier);
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (os_memcmp_const(verifier, data + 2, SHA256_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Confirm mismatch");
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0011-EAP-pwd-server-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0011-EAP-pwd-server-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..87095bf7f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0011-EAP-pwd-server-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 70ff850e89fbc8bc7da515321b4d15b5eef70581 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu>
+Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 17:13:06 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 11/14] EAP-pwd server: Verify received scalar and element
+
+When processing an EAP-pwd Commit frame, the peer's scalar and element
+(elliptic curve point) were not validated. This allowed an adversary to
+bypass authentication, and impersonate any user if the crypto
+implementation did not verify the validity of the EC point.
+
+Fix this vulnerability by assuring the received scalar lies within the
+valid range, and by checking that the received element is not the point
+at infinity and lies on the elliptic curve being used. (CVE-2019-9498)
+
+The vulnerability is only exploitable if OpenSSL version 1.0.2 or lower
+is used, or if LibreSSL or wolfssl is used. Newer versions of OpenSSL
+(and also BoringSSL) implicitly validate the elliptic curve point in
+EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(), preventing the attack.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2019-9498
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+index d0fa54a..74979da 100644
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -718,6 +718,26 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 		goto fin;
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* verify received scalar */
++	if (crypto_bignum_is_zero(data->peer_scalar) ||
++	    crypto_bignum_is_one(data->peer_scalar) ||
++	    crypto_bignum_cmp(data->peer_scalar,
++			      crypto_ec_get_order(data->grp->group)) >= 0) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-PWD (server): received scalar is invalid");
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
++	/* verify received element */
++	if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(data->grp->group,
++					 data->peer_element) ||
++	    crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(data->grp->group,
++					   data->peer_element)) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-PWD (server): received element is invalid");
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
+ 	/* check to ensure peer's element is not in a small sub-group */
+ 	if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
+ 		if (crypto_ec_point_mul(data->grp->group, data->peer_element,
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0012-EAP-pwd-server-Detect-reflection-attacks.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0012-EAP-pwd-server-Detect-reflection-attacks.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..32d134db41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0012-EAP-pwd-server-Detect-reflection-attacks.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From d63edfa90243e9a7de6ae5c275032f2cc79fef95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu>
+Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 17:26:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 12/14] EAP-pwd server: Detect reflection attacks
+
+When processing an EAP-pwd Commit frame, verify that the peer's scalar
+and elliptic curve element differ from the one sent by the server. This
+prevents reflection attacks where the adversary reflects the scalar and
+element sent by the server. (CVE-2019-9497)
+
+The vulnerability allows an adversary to complete the EAP-pwd handshake
+as any user. However, the adversary does not learn the negotiated
+session key, meaning the subsequent 4-way handshake would fail. As a
+result, this cannot be abused to bypass authentication unless EAP-pwd is
+used in non-WLAN cases without any following key exchange that would
+require the attacker to learn the MSK.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2019-9497
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+index 74979da..16057e9 100644
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -753,6 +753,15 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* detect reflection attacks */
++	if (crypto_bignum_cmp(data->my_scalar, data->peer_scalar) == 0 ||
++	    crypto_ec_point_cmp(data->grp->group, data->my_element,
++				data->peer_element) == 0) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-PWD (server): detected reflection attack!");
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
+ 	/* compute the shared key, k */
+ 	if ((crypto_ec_point_mul(data->grp->group, data->grp->pwe,
+ 				 data->peer_scalar, K) < 0) ||
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0013-EAP-pwd-client-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0013-EAP-pwd-client-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c6e61cb803
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0013-EAP-pwd-client-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 8ad8585f91823ddcc3728155e288e0f9f872e31a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu>
+Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 17:43:44 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 13/14] EAP-pwd client: Verify received scalar and element
+
+When processing an EAP-pwd Commit frame, the server's scalar and element
+(elliptic curve point) were not validated. This allowed an adversary to
+bypass authentication, and act as a rogue Access Point (AP) if the
+crypto implementation did not verify the validity of the EC point.
+
+Fix this vulnerability by assuring the received scalar lies within the
+valid range, and by checking that the received element is not the point
+at infinity and lies on the elliptic curve being used. (CVE-2019-9499)
+
+The vulnerability is only exploitable if OpenSSL version 1.0.2 or lower
+is used, or if LibreSSL or wolfssl is used. Newer versions of OpenSSL
+(and also BoringSSL) implicitly validate the elliptic curve point in
+EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(), preventing the attack.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2019-9499
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+index 761c16a..5a05e54 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -594,6 +594,26 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 		goto fin;
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* verify received scalar */
++	if (crypto_bignum_is_zero(data->server_scalar) ||
++	    crypto_bignum_is_one(data->server_scalar) ||
++	    crypto_bignum_cmp(data->server_scalar,
++			      crypto_ec_get_order(data->grp->group)) >= 0) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-PWD (peer): received scalar is invalid");
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
++	/* verify received element */
++	if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(data->grp->group,
++					 data->server_element) ||
++	    crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(data->grp->group,
++					   data->server_element)) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-PWD (peer): received element is invalid");
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
+ 	/* check to ensure server's element is not in a small sub-group */
+ 	if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
+ 		if (crypto_ec_point_mul(data->grp->group, data->server_element,
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0014-EAP-pwd-Check-element-x-y-coordinates-explicitly.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0014-EAP-pwd-Check-element-x-y-coordinates-explicitly.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e944ef110f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0014-EAP-pwd-Check-element-x-y-coordinates-explicitly.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
+From 16d4f1069118aa19bfce013493e1ac5783f92f1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2019 02:12:50 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 14/14] EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly
+
+This adds an explicit check for 0 < x,y < prime based on RFC 5931,
+2.8.5.2.2 requirement. The earlier checks might have covered this
+implicitly, but it is safer to avoid any dependency on implicit checks
+and specific crypto library behavior. (CVE-2019-9498 and CVE-2019-9499)
+
+Furthermore, this moves the EAP-pwd element and scalar parsing and
+validation steps into shared helper functions so that there is no need
+to maintain two separate copies of this common functionality between the
+server and peer implementations.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2019-9498
+CVE: CVE-2019-9499
+---
+ src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h |   3 ++
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c          |  45 ++---------------
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c |  45 ++---------------
+ 4 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+index e49aaf8..c28b56d 100644
+--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
++++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+@@ -428,3 +428,109 @@ int compute_keys(EAP_PWD_group *grp, const struct crypto_bignum *k,
+ 
+ 	return 1;
+ }
++
++
++static int eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(const struct crypto_bignum *prime,
++				    const u8 *buf, size_t len)
++{
++	struct crypto_bignum *val;
++	int ok = 1;
++
++	val = crypto_bignum_init_set(buf, len);
++	if (!val || crypto_bignum_is_zero(val) ||
++	    crypto_bignum_cmp(val, prime) >= 0)
++		ok = 0;
++	crypto_bignum_deinit(val, 0);
++	return ok;
++}
++
++
++struct crypto_ec_point * eap_pwd_get_element(EAP_PWD_group *group,
++					     const u8 *buf)
++{
++	struct crypto_ec_point *element;
++	const struct crypto_bignum *prime;
++	size_t prime_len;
++	struct crypto_bignum *cofactor = NULL;
++
++	prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(group->group);
++	prime_len = crypto_ec_prime_len(group->group);
++
++	/* RFC 5931, 2.8.5.2.2: 0 < x,y < p */
++	if (!eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(prime, buf, prime_len) ||
++	    !eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(prime, buf + prime_len, prime_len)) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Invalid coordinate in element");
++		return NULL;
++	}
++
++	element = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(group->group, buf);
++	if (!element) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: EC point from element failed");
++		return NULL;
++	}
++
++	/* RFC 5931, 2.8.5.2.2: on curve and not the point at infinity */
++	if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(group->group, element) ||
++	    crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(group->group, element)) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Invalid element");
++		goto fail;
++	}
++
++	cofactor = crypto_bignum_init();
++	if (!cofactor || crypto_ec_cofactor(group->group, cofactor) < 0) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-pwd: Unable to get cofactor for curve");
++		goto fail;
++	}
++
++	if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
++		struct crypto_ec_point *point;
++		int ok = 1;
++
++		/* check to ensure peer's element is not in a small sub-group */
++		point = crypto_ec_point_init(group->group);
++		if (!point ||
++		    crypto_ec_point_mul(group->group, element,
++					cofactor, point) != 0 ||
++		    crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(group->group, point))
++			ok = 0;
++		crypto_ec_point_deinit(point, 0);
++
++		if (!ok) {
++			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++				   "EAP-pwd: Small sub-group check on peer element failed");
++			goto fail;
++		}
++	}
++
++out:
++	crypto_bignum_deinit(cofactor, 0);
++	return element;
++fail:
++	crypto_ec_point_deinit(element, 0);
++	element = NULL;
++	goto out;
++}
++
++
++struct crypto_bignum * eap_pwd_get_scalar(EAP_PWD_group *group, const u8 *buf)
++{
++	struct crypto_bignum *scalar;
++	const struct crypto_bignum *order;
++	size_t order_len;
++
++	order = crypto_ec_get_order(group->group);
++	order_len = crypto_ec_order_len(group->group);
++
++	/* RFC 5931, 2.8.5.2: 1 < scalar < r */
++	scalar = crypto_bignum_init_set(buf, order_len);
++	if (!scalar || crypto_bignum_is_zero(scalar) ||
++	    crypto_bignum_is_one(scalar) ||
++	    crypto_bignum_cmp(scalar, order) >= 0) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: received scalar is invalid");
++		crypto_bignum_deinit(scalar, 0);
++		scalar = NULL;
++	}
++
++	return scalar;
++}
+diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h
+index 6b07cf8..2387e59 100644
+--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h
++++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h
+@@ -67,5 +67,8 @@ int compute_keys(EAP_PWD_group *grp, const struct crypto_bignum *k,
+ struct crypto_hash * eap_pwd_h_init(void);
+ void eap_pwd_h_update(struct crypto_hash *hash, const u8 *data, size_t len);
+ void eap_pwd_h_final(struct crypto_hash *hash, u8 *digest);
++struct crypto_ec_point * eap_pwd_get_element(EAP_PWD_group *group,
++					     const u8 *buf);
++struct crypto_bignum * eap_pwd_get_scalar(EAP_PWD_group *group, const u8 *buf);
+ 
+ #endif  /* EAP_PWD_COMMON_H */
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+index 5a05e54..f37b974 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 				const struct wpabuf *reqData,
+ 				const u8 *payload, size_t payload_len)
+ {
+-	struct crypto_ec_point *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
++	struct crypto_ec_point *K = NULL;
+ 	struct crypto_bignum *mask = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ 	const u8 *ptr = payload;
+ 	u8 *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
+@@ -572,63 +572,27 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 	/* process the request */
+ 	data->k = crypto_bignum_init();
+ 	K = crypto_ec_point_init(data->grp->group);
+-	point = crypto_ec_point_init(data->grp->group);
+-	if (!data->k || !K || !point) {
++	if (!data->k || !K) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): peer data allocation "
+ 			   "fail");
+ 		goto fin;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* element, x then y, followed by scalar */
+-	data->server_element = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(data->grp->group, ptr);
++	data->server_element = eap_pwd_get_element(data->grp, ptr);
+ 	if (!data->server_element) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): setting peer element "
+ 			   "fail");
+ 		goto fin;
+ 	}
+ 	ptr += prime_len * 2;
+-	data->server_scalar = crypto_bignum_init_set(ptr, order_len);
++	data->server_scalar = eap_pwd_get_scalar(data->grp, ptr);
+ 	if (!data->server_scalar) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ 			   "EAP-PWD (peer): setting peer scalar fail");
+ 		goto fin;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* verify received scalar */
+-	if (crypto_bignum_is_zero(data->server_scalar) ||
+-	    crypto_bignum_is_one(data->server_scalar) ||
+-	    crypto_bignum_cmp(data->server_scalar,
+-			      crypto_ec_get_order(data->grp->group)) >= 0) {
+-		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+-			   "EAP-PWD (peer): received scalar is invalid");
+-		goto fin;
+-	}
+-
+-	/* verify received element */
+-	if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(data->grp->group,
+-					 data->server_element) ||
+-	    crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(data->grp->group,
+-					   data->server_element)) {
+-		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+-			   "EAP-PWD (peer): received element is invalid");
+-		goto fin;
+-	}
+-
+-	/* check to ensure server's element is not in a small sub-group */
+-	if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
+-		if (crypto_ec_point_mul(data->grp->group, data->server_element,
+-					cofactor, point) < 0) {
+-			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): cannot multiply "
+-				   "server element by order!\n");
+-			goto fin;
+-		}
+-		if (crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(data->grp->group, point)) {
+-			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): server element "
+-				   "is at infinity!\n");
+-			goto fin;
+-		}
+-	}
+-
+ 	/* compute the shared key, k */
+ 	if (crypto_ec_point_mul(data->grp->group, data->grp->pwe,
+ 				data->server_scalar, K) < 0 ||
+@@ -702,7 +666,6 @@ fin:
+ 	crypto_bignum_deinit(mask, 1);
+ 	crypto_bignum_deinit(cofactor, 1);
+ 	crypto_ec_point_deinit(K, 1);
+-	crypto_ec_point_deinit(point, 1);
+ 	if (data->outbuf == NULL)
+ 		eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
+ 	else
+diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+index 16057e9..f6c75cf 100644
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ {
+ 	const u8 *ptr;
+ 	struct crypto_bignum *cofactor = NULL;
+-	struct crypto_ec_point *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
++	struct crypto_ec_point *K = NULL;
+ 	int res = 0;
+ 	size_t prime_len, order_len;
+ 
+@@ -688,9 +688,8 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 
+ 	data->k = crypto_bignum_init();
+ 	cofactor = crypto_bignum_init();
+-	point = crypto_ec_point_init(data->grp->group);
+ 	K = crypto_ec_point_init(data->grp->group);
+-	if (!data->k || !cofactor || !point || !K) {
++	if (!data->k || !cofactor || !K) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): peer data allocation "
+ 			   "fail");
+ 		goto fin;
+@@ -704,55 +703,20 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 
+ 	/* element, x then y, followed by scalar */
+ 	ptr = payload;
+-	data->peer_element = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(data->grp->group, ptr);
++	data->peer_element = eap_pwd_get_element(data->grp, ptr);
+ 	if (!data->peer_element) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): setting peer element "
+ 			   "fail");
+ 		goto fin;
+ 	}
+ 	ptr += prime_len * 2;
+-	data->peer_scalar = crypto_bignum_init_set(ptr, order_len);
++	data->peer_scalar = eap_pwd_get_scalar(data->grp, ptr);
+ 	if (!data->peer_scalar) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): peer data allocation "
+ 			   "fail");
+ 		goto fin;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* verify received scalar */
+-	if (crypto_bignum_is_zero(data->peer_scalar) ||
+-	    crypto_bignum_is_one(data->peer_scalar) ||
+-	    crypto_bignum_cmp(data->peer_scalar,
+-			      crypto_ec_get_order(data->grp->group)) >= 0) {
+-		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+-			   "EAP-PWD (server): received scalar is invalid");
+-		goto fin;
+-	}
+-
+-	/* verify received element */
+-	if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(data->grp->group,
+-					 data->peer_element) ||
+-	    crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(data->grp->group,
+-					   data->peer_element)) {
+-		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+-			   "EAP-PWD (server): received element is invalid");
+-		goto fin;
+-	}
+-
+-	/* check to ensure peer's element is not in a small sub-group */
+-	if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
+-		if (crypto_ec_point_mul(data->grp->group, data->peer_element,
+-					cofactor, point) != 0) {
+-			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): cannot "
+-				   "multiply peer element by order");
+-			goto fin;
+-		}
+-		if (crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(data->grp->group, point)) {
+-			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): peer element "
+-				   "is at infinity!\n");
+-			goto fin;
+-		}
+-	}
+-
+ 	/* detect reflection attacks */
+ 	if (crypto_bignum_cmp(data->my_scalar, data->peer_scalar) == 0 ||
+ 	    crypto_ec_point_cmp(data->grp->group, data->my_element,
+@@ -804,7 +768,6 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 
+ fin:
+ 	crypto_ec_point_deinit(K, 1);
+-	crypto_ec_point_deinit(point, 1);
+ 	crypto_bignum_deinit(cofactor, 1);
+ 
+ 	if (res)
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.7.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.7.bb
index fe5fa2b82e..277bbaec63 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.7.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.7.bb
@@ -25,6 +25,22 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz  \
            file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \
            file://99_wpa_supplicant \
            file://0001-replace-systemd-install-Alias-with-WantedBy.patch \
+           file://0001-OpenSSL-Use-constant-time-operations-for-private-big.patch \
+           file://0002-Add-helper-functions-for-constant-time-operations.patch \
+           file://0003-OpenSSL-Use-constant-time-selection-for-crypto_bignu.patch \
+           file://0004-EAP-pwd-Use-constant-time-and-memory-access-for-find.patch \
+           file://0005-SAE-Minimize-timing-differences-in-PWE-derivation.patch \
+           file://0006-SAE-Avoid-branches-in-is_quadratic_residue_blind.patch \
+           file://0007-SAE-Mask-timing-of-MODP-groups-22-23-24.patch \
+           file://0008-SAE-Use-const_time-selection-for-PWE-in-FFC.patch \
+           file://0009-SAE-Use-constant-time-operations-in-sae_test_pwd_see.patch \
+           file://0010-SAE-Fix-confirm-message-validation-in-error-cases.patch \
+           file://0011-EAP-pwd-server-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch \
+           file://0012-EAP-pwd-server-Detect-reflection-attacks.patch \
+           file://0013-EAP-pwd-client-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch \
+           file://0014-EAP-pwd-Check-element-x-y-coordinates-explicitly.patch \
+           file://0001-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-reassembly-buffer-handling.patch \
+           file://0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-reassembly-buffer-handling.patch \
           "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "a68538fb62766f40f890125026c42c10"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "76ea6b06b7a2ea8e6d9eb1a9166166f1656e6d48c7508914f592100c95c73074"