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authorLi Wang <li.wang@windriver.com>2014-05-19 13:42:53 +0800
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>2014-05-29 13:42:11 +0100
commit9f5402d5e40b82213fdfc09fcfc71d22f8bf5a0e (patch)
tree6a964695910ff80c51e059bacdac66c65f99701b
parent65ebe470a8d69073d0ebce3111abdb0c2e2ebe3c (diff)
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nss: CVE-2013-1740
the patch comes from: http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-1740 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=919877 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=713933 changeset: 10946:f28426e944ae user: Wan-Teh Chang <wtc@google.com> date: Tue Nov 26 16:44:39 2013 -0800 summary: Bug 713933: Handle the return value of both ssl3_HandleRecord calls changeset: 10945:774c7dec7565 user: Wan-Teh Chang <wtc@google.com> date: Mon Nov 25 19:16:23 2013 -0800 summary: Bug 713933: Declare the |falseStart| local variable in the smallest changeset: 10848:141fae8fb2e8 user: Wan-Teh Chang <wtc@google.com> date: Mon Sep 23 11:25:41 2013 -0700 summary: Bug 681839: Allow SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension to be called before the handshake is finished, r=brian@briansmith.org changeset: 10898:1b9c43d28713 user: Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org> date: Thu Oct 31 15:40:42 2013 -0700 summary: Bug 713933: Make SSL False Start work with asynchronous certificate validation, r=wtc (From OE-Core rev: 11e728e64e37eec72ed0cb3fb4d5a49ddeb88666) Signed-off-by: Li Wang <li.wang@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Roy Li <rongqing.li@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2013-1740.patch916
-rw-r--r--meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc1
2 files changed, 917 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2013-1740.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2013-1740.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..db3d6f9103
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2013-1740.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,916 @@
+nss: CVE-2013-1740
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+the patch comes from:
+http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-1740
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=919877
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=713933
+
+changeset: 10946:f28426e944ae
+user: Wan-Teh Chang <wtc@google.com>
+date: Tue Nov 26 16:44:39 2013 -0800
+summary: Bug 713933: Handle the return value of both ssl3_HandleRecord calls
+
+changeset: 10945:774c7dec7565
+user: Wan-Teh Chang <wtc@google.com>
+date: Mon Nov 25 19:16:23 2013 -0800
+summary: Bug 713933: Declare the |falseStart| local variable in the smallest
+
+changeset: 10848:141fae8fb2e8
+user: Wan-Teh Chang <wtc@google.com>
+date: Mon Sep 23 11:25:41 2013 -0700
+summary: Bug 681839: Allow SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension to be called before the handshake is finished, r=brian@briansmith.org
+
+changeset: 10898:1b9c43d28713
+user: Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>
+date: Thu Oct 31 15:40:42 2013 -0700
+summary: Bug 713933: Make SSL False Start work with asynchronous certificate validation, r=wtc
+
+Signed-off-by: Li Wang <li.wang@windriver.com>
+---
+ nss/lib/ssl/ssl.def | 7 ++
+ nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h | 54 +++++++++++---
+ nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c | 188 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c | 63 ++++++++++++----
+ nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c | 10 +--
+ nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h | 22 +++++-
+ nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c | 10 +--
+ nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c | 9 +--
+ nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c | 139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c | 12 ++-
+ 10 files changed, 386 insertions(+), 128 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.def b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.def
+index fbf7fc5..e937bd4 100644
+--- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.def
++++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.def
+@@ -163,3 +163,10 @@ SSL_SetStapledOCSPResponses;
+ ;+ local:
+ ;+*;
+ ;+};
++;+NSS_3.15.3 { # NSS 3.15.3 release
++;+ global:
++SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart;
++SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback;
++;+ local:
++;+*;
++;+};
+diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h
+index 6db0e34..ddeaaef 100644
+--- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h
++++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h
+@@ -121,14 +121,17 @@ SSL_IMPORT PRFileDesc *DTLS_ImportFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd);
+ #define SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START 22 /* Enable SSL false start (off by */
+ /* default, applies only to */
+ /* clients). False start is a */
+-/* mode where an SSL client will start sending application data before */
+-/* verifying the server's Finished message. This means that we could end up */
+-/* sending data to an imposter. However, the data will be encrypted and */
+-/* only the true server can derive the session key. Thus, so long as the */
+-/* cipher isn't broken this is safe. Because of this, False Start will only */
+-/* occur on RSA or DH ciphersuites where the cipher's key length is >= 80 */
+-/* bits. The advantage of False Start is that it saves a round trip for */
+-/* client-speaks-first protocols when performing a full handshake. */
++/* mode where an SSL client will start sending application data before
++ * verifying the server's Finished message. This means that we could end up
++ * sending data to an imposter. However, the data will be encrypted and
++ * only the true server can derive the session key. Thus, so long as the
++ * cipher isn't broken this is safe. The advantage of false start is that
++ * it saves a round trip for client-speaks-first protocols when performing a
++ * full handshake.
++ *
++ * In addition to enabling this option, the application must register a
++ * callback using the SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback function.
++ */
+
+ /* For SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0, by default we prevent chosen plaintext attacks
+ * on SSL CBC mode cipher suites (see RFC 4346 Section F.3) by splitting
+@@ -653,14 +656,45 @@ SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetMaxServerCacheLocks(PRUint32 maxLocks);
+ SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(const char * envString);
+
+ /*
+-** Set the callback on a particular socket that gets called when we finish
+-** performing a handshake.
++** Set the callback that gets called when a TLS handshake is complete. The
++** handshake callback is called after verifying the peer's Finished message and
++** before processing incoming application data.
++**
++** For the initial handshake: If the handshake false started (see
++** SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START), then application data may already have been sent
++** before the handshake callback is called. If we did not false start then the
++** callback will get called before any application data is sent.
+ */
+ typedef void (PR_CALLBACK *SSLHandshakeCallback)(PRFileDesc *fd,
+ void *client_data);
+ SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *fd,
+ SSLHandshakeCallback cb, void *client_data);
+
++/* Applications that wish to enable TLS false start must set this callback
++** function. NSS will invoke the functon to determine if a particular
++** connection should use false start or not. SECSuccess indicates that the
++** callback completed successfully, and if so *canFalseStart indicates if false
++** start can be used. If the callback does not return SECSuccess then the
++** handshake will be canceled. NSS's recommended criteria can be evaluated by
++** calling SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart.
++**
++** If no false start callback is registered then false start will never be
++** done, even if the SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START option is enabled.
++**/
++typedef SECStatus (PR_CALLBACK *SSLCanFalseStartCallback)(
++ PRFileDesc *fd, void *arg, PRBool *canFalseStart);
++
++SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback(
++ PRFileDesc *fd, SSLCanFalseStartCallback callback, void *arg);
++
++/* This function sets *canFalseStart according to the recommended criteria for
++** false start. These criteria may change from release to release and may depend
++** on which handshake features have been negotiated and/or properties of the
++** certifciates/keys used on the connection.
++*/
++SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart(PRFileDesc *fd,
++ PRBool *canFalseStart);
++
+ /*
+ ** For the server, request a new handshake. For the client, begin a new
+ ** handshake. If flushCache is non-zero, the SSL3 cache entry will be
+diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
+index 61d24d9..f39ba09 100644
+--- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
++++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
+@@ -2535,7 +2535,7 @@ ssl3_SendRecord( sslSocket * ss,
+ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] SendRecord type: %s nIn=%d",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeContentType(type),
+ nIn));
+- PRINT_BUF(3, (ss, "Send record (plain text)", pIn, nIn));
++ PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Send record (plain text)", pIn, nIn));
+
+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) );
+
+@@ -6674,36 +6674,73 @@ done:
+ return rv;
+ }
+
++static SECStatus
++ssl3_CheckFalseStart(sslSocket *ss)
++{
++ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
++ PORT_Assert( !ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending );
++ PORT_Assert( !ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart );
++
++ if (!ss->canFalseStartCallback) {
++ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start callback so no false start",
++ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
++ } else {
++ PRBool maybeFalseStart;
++ SECStatus rv;
++
++ /* An attacker can control the selected ciphersuite so we only wish to
++ * do False Start in the case that the selected ciphersuite is
++ * sufficiently strong that the attack can gain no advantage.
++ * Therefore we always require an 80-bit cipher. */
++ ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
++ maybeFalseStart = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->secret_key_size >= 10;
++ ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
++
++ if (!maybeFalseStart) {
++ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start due to weak cipher",
++ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
++ } else {
++ rv = (ss->canFalseStartCallback)(ss->fd,
++ ss->canFalseStartCallbackData,
++ &ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart);
++ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
++ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback returned %s",
++ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
++ ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart ? "TRUE" : "FALSE"));
++ } else {
++ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback failed (%s)",
++ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
++ PR_ErrorToName(PR_GetError())));
++ }
++ return rv;
++ }
++ }
++
++ ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
++ return SECSuccess;
++}
++
+ PRBool
+-ssl3_CanFalseStart(sslSocket *ss) {
+- PRBool rv;
++ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
++{
++ PRBool result = PR_FALSE;
+
+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) );
+
+- /* XXX: does not take into account whether we are waiting for
+- * SSL_AuthCertificateComplete or SSL_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq. If/when
+- * that is done, this function could return different results each time it
+- * would be called.
+- */
++ switch (ss->ssl3.hs.ws) {
++ case wait_new_session_ticket:
++ result = PR_TRUE;
++ break;
++ case wait_change_cipher:
++ result = !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn);
++ break;
++ case wait_finished:
++ break;
++ default:
++ PR_NOT_REACHED("ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound");
++ }
+
+- ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss);
+- rv = ss->opt.enableFalseStart &&
+- !ss->sec.isServer &&
+- !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming &&
+- ss->ssl3.cwSpec &&
+-
+- /* An attacker can control the selected ciphersuite so we only wish to
+- * do False Start in the case that the selected ciphersuite is
+- * sufficiently strong that the attack can gain no advantage.
+- * Therefore we require an 80-bit cipher and a forward-secret key
+- * exchange. */
+- ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipher_def->secret_key_size >= 10 &&
+- (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_dss ||
+- ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_rsa ||
+- ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa ||
+- ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa);
+- ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+- return rv;
++ return result;
+ }
+
+ static SECStatus ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss);
+@@ -6785,6 +6822,9 @@ ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
+ }
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending &&
+ (sendClientCert || ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert || ss->firstHsDone)) {
++ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring ssl3_SendClientSecondRound because"
++ " certificate authentication is still pending.",
++ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+ ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound;
+ return SECWouldBlock;
+ }
+@@ -6822,14 +6862,50 @@ ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
+ goto loser; /* err code was set. */
+ }
+
+- /* XXX: If the server's certificate hasn't been authenticated by this
+- * point, then we may be leaking this NPN message to an attacker.
++ /* This must be done after we've set ss->ssl3.cwSpec in
++ * ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs because SSL_GetChannelInfo uses information
++ * from cwSpec. This must be done before we call ssl3_CheckFalseStart
++ * because the false start callback (if any) may need the information from
++ * the functions that depend on this being set.
+ */
++ ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
++
+ if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
++ /* XXX: If the server's certificate hasn't been authenticated by this
++ * point, then we may be leaking this NPN message to an attacker.
++ */
+ rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser; /* err code was set. */
+ }
++
++ if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart) {
++ if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) {
++ /* When we fix bug 589047, we will need to know whether we are
++ * false starting before we try to flush the client second
++ * round to the network. With that in mind, we purposefully
++ * call ssl3_CheckFalseStart before calling ssl3_SendFinished,
++ * which includes a call to ssl3_FlushHandshake, so that
++ * no application develops a reliance on such flushing being
++ * done before its false start callback is called.
++ */
++ ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss);
++ rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss);
++ ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss);
++ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
++ goto loser;
++ }
++ } else {
++ /* The certificate authentication and the server's Finished
++ * message are racing each other. If the certificate
++ * authentication wins, then we will try to false start in
++ * ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete.
++ */
++ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring false start check because"
++ " certificate authentication is still pending.",
++ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
++ }
++ }
+ }
+
+ rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0);
+@@ -6844,10 +6920,7 @@ ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss)
+ else
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher;
+
+- /* Do the handshake callback for sslv3 here, if we can false start. */
+- if (ss->handshakeCallback != NULL && ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
+- (ss->handshakeCallback)(ss->fd, ss->handshakeCallbackData);
+- }
++ PORT_Assert(ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(ss));
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+
+@@ -9421,13 +9494,6 @@ ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss)
+
+ ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_TRUE;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+-
+- /* XXX: Async cert validation and False Start don't work together
+- * safely yet; if we leave False Start enabled, we may end up false
+- * starting (sending application data) before we
+- * SSL_AuthCertificateComplete has been called.
+- */
+- ss->opt.enableFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+@@ -9551,6 +9617,12 @@ ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode error)
+ } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget != NULL) {
+ sslRestartTarget target = ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget;
+ ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL;
++
++ if (target == ssl3_FinishHandshake) {
++ SSL_TRC(3,("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication lost the race"
++ " with peer's finished message", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
++ }
++
+ rv = target(ss);
+ /* Even if we blocked here, we have accomplished enough to claim
+ * success. Any remaining work will be taken care of by subsequent
+@@ -9560,7 +9632,29 @@ ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode error)
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ }
+ } else {
+- rv = SECSuccess;
++ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication won the race with"
++ " peer's finished message", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
++
++ PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);
++ PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
++ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming);
++ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_new_session_ticket ||
++ ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_change_cipher ||
++ ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_finished);
++
++ /* ssl3_SendClientSecondRound deferred the false start check because
++ * certificate authentication was pending, so we do it now if we still
++ * haven't received any of the server's second round yet.
++ */
++ if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart &&
++ !ss->firstHsDone &&
++ !ss->sec.isServer &&
++ !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming &&
++ ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(ss)) {
++ rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss);
++ } else {
++ rv = SECSuccess;
++ }
+ }
+
+ done:
+@@ -10023,9 +10117,6 @@ xmit_loser:
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+- ss->gs.writeOffset = 0;
+- ss->gs.readOffset = 0;
+-
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) {
+ effectiveExchKeyType = kt_rsa;
+ } else {
+@@ -10090,6 +10181,9 @@ xmit_loser:
+ return rv;
+ }
+
++/* The return type is SECStatus instead of void because this function needs
++ * to have type sslRestartTarget.
++ */
+ SECStatus
+ ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket * ss)
+ {
+@@ -10099,19 +10193,16 @@ ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket * ss)
+
+ /* The first handshake is now completed. */
+ ss->handshake = NULL;
+- ss->firstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+
+ if (ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID) {
+ (*ss->sec.cache)(ss->sec.ci.sid);
+ ss->ssl3.hs.cacheSID = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
++ ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; /* False Start phase is complete */
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws = idle_handshake;
+
+- /* Do the handshake callback for sslv3 here, if we cannot false start. */
+- if (ss->handshakeCallback != NULL && !ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
+- (ss->handshakeCallback)(ss->fd, ss->handshakeCallbackData);
+- }
++ ssl_FinishHandshake(ss);
+
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+@@ -11045,7 +11136,6 @@ process_it:
+
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ return rv;
+-
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c
+index 6d62515..03e369d 100644
+--- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c
++++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c
+@@ -275,11 +275,17 @@ ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
+ {
+ SSL3Ciphertext cText;
+ int rv;
+- PRBool canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
++ PRBool keepGoing = PR_TRUE;
+
+ SSL_TRC(30, ("ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake"));
+
++ /* ssl3_HandleRecord may end up eventually calling ssl_FinishHandshake,
++ * which requires the 1stHandshakeLock, which must be acquired before the
++ * RecvBufLock.
++ */
++ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
++
+ do {
+ PRBool handleRecordNow = PR_FALSE;
+
+@@ -368,20 +374,48 @@ ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
+ if (rv < 0) {
+ return ss->recvdCloseNotify ? 0 : rv;
+ }
++ if (rv == (int) SECSuccess && ss->gs.buf.len > 0) {
++ /* We have application data to return to the application. This
++ * prioritizes returning application data to the application over
++ * completing any renegotiation handshake we may be doing.
++ */
++ PORT_Assert(ss->firstHsDone);
++ PORT_Assert(cText.type == content_application_data);
++ break;
++ }
+
+- /* If we kicked off a false start in ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone, break
+- * out of this loop early without finishing the handshake.
+- */
+- if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart) {
+- ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+- canFalseStart = (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_change_cipher ||
+- ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_new_session_ticket) &&
+- ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss);
+- ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
++ PORT_Assert(keepGoing);
++ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
++ if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake) {
++ /* We are done with the current handshake so stop trying to
++ * handshake. Note that it would be safe to test ss->firstHsDone
++ * instead of ss->ssl3.hs.ws. By testing ss->ssl3.hs.ws instead,
++ * we prioritize completing a renegotiation handshake over sending
++ * application data.
++ */
++ PORT_Assert(ss->firstHsDone);
++ PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart);
++ keepGoing = PR_FALSE;
++ } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart) {
++ /* Prioritize sending application data over trying to complete
++ * the handshake if we're false starting.
++ *
++ * If we were to do this check at the beginning of the loop instead
++ * of here, then this function would become be a no-op after
++ * receiving the ServerHelloDone in the false start case, and we
++ * would never complete the handshake.
++ */
++ PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);
++
++ if (ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(ss)) {
++ keepGoing = PR_FALSE;
++ } else {
++ ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
++ }
+ }
+- } while (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake &&
+- !canFalseStart &&
+- ss->gs.buf.len == 0);
++ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
++ } while (keepGoing);
++
+
+ ss->gs.readOffset = 0;
+ ss->gs.writeOffset = ss->gs.buf.len;
+@@ -404,7 +438,10 @@ ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
+ {
+ int rv;
+
++ /* ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake requires both of these locks. */
++ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
+ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
++
+ do {
+ rv = ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(ss, flags);
+ } while (rv > 0 && ss->gs.buf.len == 0);
+diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c b/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c
+index d2f57bf..cb956d4 100644
+--- a/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c
++++ b/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c
+@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@ SSL_SecurityStatus(PRFileDesc *fd, int *op, char **cp, int *kp0, int *kp1,
+ sslSocket *ss;
+ const char *cipherName;
+ PRBool isDes = PR_FALSE;
+- PRBool enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
+
+ ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
+ if (!ss) {
+@@ -78,14 +77,7 @@ SSL_SecurityStatus(PRFileDesc *fd, int *op, char **cp, int *kp0, int *kp1,
+ *op = SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_OFF;
+ }
+
+- if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+- enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+- } else if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 &&
+- ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
+- enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+- }
+-
+- if (ss->opt.useSecurity && enoughFirstHsDone) {
++ if (ss->opt.useSecurity && ss->enoughFirstHsDone) {
+ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+ cipherName = ssl_cipherName[ss->sec.cipherType];
+ } else {
+diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h b/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h
+index 90e9567..bf0d67f 100644
+--- a/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h
++++ b/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h
+@@ -842,6 +842,8 @@ const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suite_def;
+ /* Shared state between ssl3_HandleFinished and ssl3_FinishHandshake */
+ PRBool cacheSID;
+
++ PRBool canFalseStart; /* Can/did we False Start */
++
+ /* clientSigAndHash contains the contents of the signature_algorithms
+ * extension (if any) from the client. This is only valid for TLS 1.2
+ * or later. */
+@@ -1116,6 +1118,10 @@ struct sslSocketStr {
+ unsigned long clientAuthRequested;
+ unsigned long delayDisabled; /* Nagle delay disabled */
+ unsigned long firstHsDone; /* first handshake is complete. */
++ unsigned long enoughFirstHsDone; /* enough of the first handshake is
++ * done for callbacks to be able to
++ * retrieve channel security
++ * parameters from the SSL socket. */
+ unsigned long handshakeBegun;
+ unsigned long lastWriteBlocked;
+ unsigned long recvdCloseNotify; /* received SSL EOF. */
+@@ -1156,6 +1162,8 @@ const unsigned char * preferredCipher;
+ void *badCertArg;
+ SSLHandshakeCallback handshakeCallback;
+ void *handshakeCallbackData;
++ SSLCanFalseStartCallback canFalseStartCallback;
++ void *canFalseStartCallbackData;
+ void *pkcs11PinArg;
+ SSLNextProtoCallback nextProtoCallback;
+ void *nextProtoArg;
+@@ -1358,7 +1366,19 @@ extern void ssl3_SetAlwaysBlock(sslSocket *ss);
+
+ extern SECStatus ssl_EnableNagleDelay(sslSocket *ss, PRBool enabled);
+
+-extern PRBool ssl3_CanFalseStart(sslSocket *ss);
++extern void ssl_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss);
++
++/* Returns PR_TRUE if we are still waiting for the server to respond to our
++ * client second round. Once we've received any part of the server's second
++ * round then we don't bother trying to false start since it is almost always
++ * the case that the NewSessionTicket, ChangeCipherSoec, and Finished messages
++ * were sent in the same packet and we want to process them all at the same
++ * time. If we were to try to false start in the middle of the server's second
++ * round, then we would increase the number of I/O operations
++ * (SSL_ForceHandshake/PR_Recv/PR_Send/etc.) needed to finish the handshake.
++ */
++extern PRBool ssl3_WaitingForStartOfServerSecondRound(sslSocket *ss);
++
+ extern SECStatus
+ ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec * cwSpec,
+ PRBool isServer,
+diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c b/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c
+index 9f2597e..d0c23b7 100644
+--- a/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c
++++ b/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c
+@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ SSL_GetChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLChannelInfo *info, PRUintn len)
+ sslSocket * ss;
+ SSLChannelInfo inf;
+ sslSessionID * sid;
+- PRBool enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
+
+ if (!info || len < sizeof inf.length) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+@@ -43,14 +42,7 @@ SSL_GetChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLChannelInfo *info, PRUintn len)
+ memset(&inf, 0, sizeof inf);
+ inf.length = PR_MIN(sizeof inf, len);
+
+- if (ss->firstHsDone) {
+- enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+- } else if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 &&
+- ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
+- enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+- }
+-
+- if (ss->opt.useSecurity && enoughFirstHsDone) {
++ if (ss->opt.useSecurity && ss->enoughFirstHsDone) {
+ sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
+ inf.protocolVersion = ss->version;
+ inf.authKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits;
+diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c b/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c
+index dc14794..d972998 100644
+--- a/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c
++++ b/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c
+@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(PRFileDesc * socket,
+ {
+ /* some decisions derived from SSL_GetChannelInfo */
+ sslSocket * sslsocket = NULL;
+- PRBool enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
+
+ if (!pYes) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+@@ -93,14 +92,8 @@ SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(PRFileDesc * socket,
+
+ *pYes = PR_FALSE;
+
+- if (sslsocket->firstHsDone) {
+- enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+- } else if (sslsocket->ssl3.initialized && ssl3_CanFalseStart(sslsocket)) {
+- enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+- }
+-
+ /* according to public API SSL_GetChannelInfo, this doesn't need a lock */
+- if (sslsocket->opt.useSecurity && enoughFirstHsDone) {
++ if (sslsocket->opt.useSecurity) {
+ if (sslsocket->ssl3.initialized) { /* SSL3 and TLS */
+ /* now we know this socket went through ssl3_InitState() and
+ * ss->xtnData got initialized, which is the only member accessed by
+diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c b/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c
+index 49bb42b..d0df442 100644
+--- a/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c
++++ b/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c
+@@ -97,23 +97,13 @@ ssl_Do1stHandshake(sslSocket *ss)
+ ss->securityHandshake = 0;
+ }
+ if (ss->handshake == 0) {
+- ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
+- ss->gs.recordLen = 0;
+- ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+-
+- SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: handshake is completed",
+- SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+- /* call handshake callback for ssl v2 */
+- /* for v3 this is done in ssl3_HandleFinished() */
+- if ((ss->handshakeCallback != NULL) && /* has callback */
+- (!ss->firstHsDone) && /* only first time */
+- (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) { /* not ssl3 */
+- ss->firstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+- (ss->handshakeCallback)(ss->fd, ss->handshakeCallbackData);
++ /* for v3 this is done in ssl3_FinishHandshake */
++ if (!ss->firstHsDone && ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
++ ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
++ ss->gs.recordLen = 0;
++ ssl_FinishHandshake(ss);
++ ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+ }
+- ss->firstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
+- ss->gs.writeOffset = 0;
+- ss->gs.readOffset = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ rv = (*ss->handshake)(ss);
+@@ -134,6 +124,24 @@ ssl_Do1stHandshake(sslSocket *ss)
+ return rv;
+ }
+
++void
++ssl_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss)
++{
++ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) );
++ PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) );
++
++ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: handshake is completed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
++
++ ss->firstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
++ ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE;
++ ss->gs.writeOffset = 0;
++ ss->gs.readOffset = 0;
++
++ if (ss->handshakeCallback) {
++ (ss->handshakeCallback)(ss->fd, ss->handshakeCallbackData);
++ }
++}
++
+ /*
+ * Handshake function that blocks. Used to force a
+ * retry on a connection on the next read/write.
+@@ -206,6 +214,7 @@ SSL_ResetHandshake(PRFileDesc *s, PRBool asServer)
+ ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss);
+
+ ss->firstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
++ ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE;
+ if ( asServer ) {
+ ss->handshake = ssl2_BeginServerHandshake;
+ ss->handshaking = sslHandshakingAsServer;
+@@ -221,6 +230,8 @@ SSL_ResetHandshake(PRFileDesc *s, PRBool asServer)
+ ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
+
+ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
++ ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
++ ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ ** Blow away old security state and get a fresh setup.
+@@ -331,6 +342,71 @@ SSL_HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLHandshakeCallback cb,
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
++/* Register an application callback to be called when false start may happen.
++** Acquires and releases HandshakeLock.
++*/
++SECStatus
++SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLCanFalseStartCallback cb,
++ void *arg)
++{
++ sslSocket *ss;
++
++ ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
++ if (!ss) {
++ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback",
++ SSL_GETPID(), fd));
++ return SECFailure;
++ }
++
++ if (!ss->opt.useSecurity) {
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
++ return SECFailure;
++ }
++
++ ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss);
++ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
++
++ ss->canFalseStartCallback = cb;
++ ss->canFalseStartCallbackData = arg;
++
++ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
++ ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss);
++
++ return SECSuccess;
++}
++
++SECStatus
++SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool *canFalseStart)
++{
++ sslSocket *ss;
++
++ *canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
++ ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
++ if (!ss) {
++ SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart",
++ SSL_GETPID(), fd));
++ return SECFailure;
++ }
++
++ if (!ss->ssl3.initialized) {
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
++ return SECFailure;
++ }
++
++ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
++ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SSL2);
++ return SECFailure;
++ }
++
++ /* Require a forward-secret key exchange. */
++ *canFalseStart = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_dss ||
++ ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_rsa ||
++ ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa ||
++ ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa;
++
++ return SECSuccess;
++}
++
+ /* Try to make progress on an SSL handshake by attempting to read the
+ ** next handshake from the peer, and sending any responses.
+ ** For non-blocking sockets, returns PR_ERROR_WOULD_BLOCK if it cannot
+@@ -524,6 +600,9 @@ DoRecv(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *out, int len, int flags)
+ int amount;
+ int available;
+
++ /* ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord may call ssl_FinishHandshake, which needs the
++ * 1stHandshakeLock. */
++ ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss);
+ ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss);
+
+ available = ss->gs.writeOffset - ss->gs.readOffset;
+@@ -590,6 +669,7 @@ DoRecv(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *out, int len, int flags)
+
+ done:
+ ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss);
++ ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+@@ -1156,7 +1236,7 @@ ssl_SecureRead(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buf, int len)
+ int
+ ssl_SecureSend(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, int len, int flags)
+ {
+- int rv = 0;
++ int rv = 0;
+
+ SSL_TRC(2, ("%d: SSL[%d]: SecureSend: sending %d bytes",
+ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, len));
+@@ -1191,19 +1271,15 @@ ssl_SecureSend(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, int len, int flags)
+ ss->writerThread = PR_GetCurrentThread();
+ /* If any of these is non-zero, the initial handshake is not done. */
+ if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
+- PRBool canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
++ PRBool falseStart = PR_FALSE;
+ ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss);
+- if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
++ if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart &&
++ ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+- if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_change_cipher ||
+- ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_finished ||
+- ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_new_session_ticket) &&
+- ssl3_CanFalseStart(ss)) {
+- canFalseStart = PR_TRUE;
+- }
++ falseStart = ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart;
+ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
+ }
+- if (!canFalseStart &&
++ if (!falseStart &&
+ (ss->handshake || ss->nextHandshake || ss->securityHandshake)) {
+ rv = ssl_Do1stHandshake(ss);
+ }
+@@ -1228,6 +1304,17 @@ ssl_SecureSend(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, int len, int flags)
+ goto done;
+ }
+
++ if (!ss->firstHsDone) {
++ PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
++#ifdef DEBUG
++ ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
++ PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart);
++ ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
++#endif
++ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: SecureSend: sending data due to false start",
++ SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
++ }
++
+ /* Send out the data using one of these functions:
+ * ssl2_SendClear, ssl2_SendStream, ssl2_SendBlock,
+ * ssl3_SendApplicationData
+diff --git a/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c b/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
+index cd4a7a7..73e069b 100644
+--- a/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
++++ b/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c
+@@ -349,6 +349,8 @@ ssl_DupSocket(sslSocket *os)
+ ss->badCertArg = os->badCertArg;
+ ss->handshakeCallback = os->handshakeCallback;
+ ss->handshakeCallbackData = os->handshakeCallbackData;
++ ss->canFalseStartCallback = os->canFalseStartCallback;
++ ss->canFalseStartCallbackData = os->canFalseStartCallbackData;
+ ss->pkcs11PinArg = os->pkcs11PinArg;
+
+ /* Create security data */
+@@ -2341,10 +2343,14 @@ ssl_Poll(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt16 how_flags, PRInt16 *p_out_flags)
+ } else if (new_flags & PR_POLL_WRITE) {
+ /* The caller is trying to write, but the handshake is
+ ** blocked waiting for data to read, and the first
+- ** handshake has been sent. so do NOT to poll on write.
++ ** handshake has been sent. So do NOT to poll on write
++ ** unless we did false start.
+ */
+- new_flags ^= PR_POLL_WRITE; /* don't select on write. */
+- new_flags |= PR_POLL_READ; /* do select on read. */
++ if (!(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 &&
++ ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart)) {
++ new_flags ^= PR_POLL_WRITE; /* don't select on write. */
++ }
++ new_flags |= PR_POLL_READ; /* do select on read. */
+ }
+ }
+ } else if ((new_flags & PR_POLL_READ) && (SSL_DataPending(fd) > 0)) {
+--
+1.7.9.5
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc b/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc
index fbe4001f0e..5afd63914b 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ SRC_URI = "\
file://nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1741.patch \
file://nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-5605.patch \
file://nss-CVE-2014-1492.patch \
+ file://nss-CVE-2013-1740.patch \
"
SRC_URI_append_class-target = "\
file://nss.pc.in \