opensc: Fix CVE-2023-40660

Upstream-Status: Backport [https://salsa.debian.org/opensc-team/opensc/-/commit/940e8bc764047c873f88bb1396933a5368d03533]

Signed-off-by: virendra thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>

2 files changed, 56 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/opensc/CVE-2023-40660.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/opensc/CVE-2023-40660.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..74e547298f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/opensc/CVE-2023-40660.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+Origin: https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/868f76fb31255fd3fdacfc3e476452efeb61c3e7
+From: Frank Morgner <frankmorgner@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 12:27:23 +0200
+Subject: Fixed PIN authentication bypass
+
+If two processes are accessing a token, then one process may leave the
+card usable with an authenticated PIN so that a key may sign/decrypt any
+data. This is especially the case if the token does not support a way of
+resetting the authentication status (logout).
+
+We have some tracking of the authentication status in software via
+PKCS#11, Minidriver (os-wise) and CryptoTokenKit, which is why a
+PIN-prompt will appear even though the card may technically be unlocked
+as described in the above example. However, before this change, an empty
+PIN was not verified (likely yielding an error during PIN-verification),
+but it was just checked whether the PIN is authenticated. This defeats
+the purpose of the PIN verification, because an empty PIN is not the
+correct one. Especially during OS Logon, we don't want that kind of
+shortcut, but we want the user to verify the correct PIN (even though
+the token was left unattended and authentication at the computer).
+
+This essentially reverts commit e6f7373ef066cfab6e3162e8b5f692683db23864.
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-40660
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://salsa.debian.org/opensc-team/opensc/-/commit/940e8bc764047c873f88bb1396933a5368d03533]
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+---
+ src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c | 13 -------------
+ 1 file changed, 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c
+index 80a185fecd..393234efe4 100644
+--- a/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c
++++ b/src/libopensc/pkcs15-pin.c
+@@ -307,19 +307,6 @@
+ 		LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_PIN_REFERENCE);
+ 	auth_info = (struct sc_pkcs15_auth_info *)pin_obj->data;
+ 
+-	/*
+-	 * if pin cache is disabled, we can get here with no PIN data.
+-	 * in this case, to avoid error or unnecessary pin prompting on pinpad,
+-	 * check if the PIN has been already verified and the access condition
+-	 * is still open on card.
+-	 */
+-	if (pinlen == 0) {
+-	    r = sc_pkcs15_get_pin_info(p15card, pin_obj);
+-
+-	    if (r == SC_SUCCESS && auth_info->logged_in == SC_PIN_STATE_LOGGED_IN)
+-		LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, r);
+-	}
+-
+ 	r = _validate_pin(p15card, auth_info, pinlen);
+ 
+ 	if (r)
+
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/opensc_0.20.0.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/opensc_0.20.0.bb
index b8cf203b7f..3e77b88840 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/opensc_0.20.0.bb
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-support/opensc/opensc_0.20.0.bb
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=7fbc338309ac38fefcd64b04bb903e34"
 #v0.19.0
 SRCREV = "45e29056ccde422e70ed3585084a7f150c632515"
 SRC_URI = "git://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC;branch=master;protocol=https \
+           file://CVE-2023-40660.patch \
           "
 DEPENDS = "virtual/libiconv openssl"